Uncertainty \u3e Risk: Lessons for Legal Thought from the Insurance Runoff Market by Baker, Tom
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2-4-2020 
Uncertainty > Risk: Lessons for Legal Thought from the Insurance 
Runoff Market 
Tom Baker 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, Finance Commons, Insurance Commons, Insurance Law Commons, 
Law and Economics Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Repository Citation 
Baker, Tom, "Uncertainty > Risk: Lessons for Legal Thought from the Insurance Runoff Market" (2020). 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2141. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2141 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
UNCERTAINTY > RISK: LESSONS FOR LEGAL 
THOUGHT FROM THE INSURANCE RUNOFF 
MARKET 
 
Tom Baker1 
 
 
Abstract 
Insurance ideas inform legal thought: from tort law, to health law, to theories of 
distributive justice.  Within legal thought, insurance is often conceived as an 
ideal type in which insurers distribute determinable risks through contracts 
that fix the parties’ obligations in advance.  This ideal type has normative 
appeal, among other reasons because it explains how tort law might achieve in 
practice the objectives of tort theory.  Significantly for tort theory, this ideal type 
supports a restrictive vision of liability-based regulation, on the grounds that 
uncertainty poses an existential threat to insurance markets.   
Prior work has criticized this restrictive vision on normative grounds.  This 
article criticizes that vision on empirical grounds. The article describes an 
emerging secondary insurance market – the insurance runoff market – that 
transfers liabilities under insurance policies issued many years in the past.  
Having started with old asbestos and hazardous waste liabilities, the market 
now extends to other liabilities that have not worked out well for the companies 
that insured them, including workers compensation, savings-linked life 
insurance, pension and annuity guarantees, and long term care insurance.  
Runoff specialists reprice these legacy insurance liabilities with hindsight, 
consolidate them, and take calculated risks that encourage capital to enter the 
runoff market.   That market transforms the uncertainties of the past into 
today’s tradeable risks, bringing into the open a dynamic that pervades 
insurance markets: namely, the promises that are made in all insurance policies 
get bundled and reconceptualized into sets of liabilities that are valued and 
revalued, further combined and redefined over time.   
Through the lens of the runoff market we can see many ways that insurance 
organizations manage uncertainty, revealing the resilience in insurance 
markets and the flexibility and innovation that produce that resilience.  The 
runoff market counsels us to give much less weight to arguments that expanding 
liability will undermine insurance markets. Insurance already involves so much 
uncertainty, and insurers have so many ways to manage it, that the most likely 
result will always be that they will continue to muddle through.  
 
1 William Maul Measey Professor, Penn Law School.  Thank you to the runoff market 
participants who have generously spoken me, not all of whom agree with my analysis or 
conclusions.  For helpful comments on earlier drafts, thank you to Sean Fitzpatrick, Kyle 
Logue, Peter Molk, Victor Nelligan, Travis Pantin, Natasha Sarin, Tony Sebok, Peter 
Siegelman, Shauhin Talesh, and Ben Zipursky.  Thank you to Alexis Caris, Taylor 
Hertzler, Kayla Katz, and Sam Tang for research assistance.  Thank you for feedback from 
participants at workshops at Villanova, Hebrew University, IDC, and Penn Law Schools. 
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Insurance ideas, practices, and metaphors inform legal 
thought. From the loss spreading that powered the expansion of 
tort liability, to the moral hazard that haunts financial services 
regulation, to the adverse selection that lies behind the design of 
the Affordable Care Act, and even to theories of distributive 
justice, an insurance idea or metaphor often lies at the core of the 
analysis.2 Scholars in fields as diverse as civil procedure, torts, 
corporations, contracts, and employment law use insurance 
practices as a window on the law in action.3 Legal historians 
study private insurance to learn about the origins of the welfare 
state.4  And recent legal scholarship reveals insurers to be, among 
other things, soft-law makers extraordinaire, private regulators 
of public police, and enablers of securities fraud.5   
Despite this widespread use of insurance ideas, 
metaphors, and practices in legal thought, the dominant image of 
 
2 On loss spreading and torts, see, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk 
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); George L. Priest, The Current 
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1525 (1987) (“This insurance 
rationale suffuses our modern civil law.”).  On moral hazard and financial services 
regulation, see, e.g., Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last 
Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (2016).  See also Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral 
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996) (explaining origins of the term “moral hazard” in the 
insurance trade). On legal rules designed to address adverse selection, see, Peter 
Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 
1223 (2004); cf. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and 
Risk Classification, in RISK AND MORALITY (Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle, eds., 2003) 
(explaining origins of the term “adverse selection” in the insurance trade).  On insurance 
metaphors in distributive justice see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 73 et seq 
(developing a distributional theory using a hypothetical insurance market); Daniel 
Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291 (using 
Dworkin’s model to reveal limits to redistribution). 
3 See, e.g., Joanna Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885 (2014); Nora 
Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 805 (2011), Steven 
Yeazell, Refinancing Litigation, 51 DePaul Law Review 183 (2001); Bernie Black on 
medical malpractice litigation, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies; Sean Griffith, Deal 
Insurance: Representation and Warranty Insurance in Corporate Acquisitions, -- U. Minn. 
L. Rev. – (forthcoming 2020). 
4 See Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State (2013); John Fabian Witt, The 
Accidental Republic (2006).  
5 See Shauhin Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance 
Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Businesses, 43 Law & Soc. Inq. 417 (2018); 
John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1539 
(2017); Shauhin Talesh, Legal Intermediaries: How Insurance Companies Construct the 
Meaning of Compliance with Anti-Discrimination Laws, 37 Law & Pol'y 209 (2015); Omri 
Ben-Shahar & Kyle Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral 
Hazard, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 197 (2012); TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING 
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT (2010). 
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insurance that appears in legal writing is a caricature.  Almost 
without exception, the insurance that appears in legal 
scholarship is an ideal type that involves the fixed-in-advance 
distribution of determinable risks – in which insurance 
companies sell protection against defined categories of losses 
whose total cost can be accurately predicted and, therefore, priced 
with confidence when insurance is sold.6  
As any torts scholar can attest, this ideal type has great 
normative appeal.  If insurers can accurately assess risk and price 
insurance on that basis, then liability insurance allows tort law 
to achieve in practice the deterrence and compensation objectives 
of tort theory.  Risk-based pricing serves as the cost-
internalization mechanism for ordinary people and organizations 
that provided the classic deterrence justification for strict 
products liability; and the liability insurance claims process 
provides the compensation, assessing and paying for tort losses 
and then feeding those payments back into the risk assessment 
and pricing process.  The appeal of this ideal type extends beyond 
tort law, however.  If insurance companies sell protection against 
defined categories of loss whose cost can be accurately predicted 
and, therefore, priced with confidence when insurance is sold, 
then risk-based pricing is not only efficient, it is, at least in most 
circumstances, fair:  those prices accurately represent the 
expected value of the insurance to the people who buy it, such that 
 
6 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 1, at 73 et seq (discussing the “value of insurance” in ways 
that imply a fixed in advance distribution of determinable risks); Priest, supra note 1, at 
1539-40 (“Insurance . . . requires that the loss be probabilistic, either as to whether or not 
it occurs at all (for example, whether one’s house burns down) or as to when the loss occurs 
(for example, whether one dies before or after full life expectancy).”); Calabresi, supra note 
1, at 529-530 (unforeseeable risks that would be shifted by strict liability cannot be priced 
in market insurance and would among the “uninsurable risks” that entrepreneurs would 
assume under a strict liability regime); Kenneth Abraham, Environmental Liability and 
the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 946-47 (1988) (“Insurance operates most 
comfortably with stochastic events, in which the probability of the frequency and 
magnitude of insured losses that will be suffered by policyholders is highly predictable”); 
John Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to 
Parketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 734, 755 (1983) (“How does one spread the loss of an 
unknowable hazard? How can insurance premiums be calculated for this purpose? Indeed, 
will insurance be available at all?”).  Cf. Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance 
Companies: Mutual versus Stock, 1 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 125 (1985) (treating the fixed-in-
advance, distribution of determinable risks as the ideal type for commercial insurance and 
explaining that the inability to satisfy this ideal type for certain risks helps to explain the 
presence of the mutual form of insurance organization). 
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private insurance arrangements satisfy in practice the principles 
of what Travis Pantin refers to as “preservative redistribution.”7 
Legal scholars recognize that the classic “information 
problems” of adverse selection and moral hazard complicate 
insurers’ ability to achieve that ideal type, but those problems 
typically are understood as (manageable) constraints on insurers’ 
ability to price and select risks with precision, not as a challenge 
to this fundamental conception of insurance.8  Indeed, so well 
established is the fixed-in-advance, determinable-risk conception 
of insurance as, not only a normative ideal, but also an accurate 
description of how insurance actually works, that George Priest’s 
Yale Law Journal article about the 1980’s liability insurance 
crisis (which remains one of the boldest efforts to use insurance 
ideas to shape legal doctrine) could call for the restoration of pre-
1960 product liability law on the grounds that strict liability had 
destabilized insurance markets by undermining insurers’ ability 
to predict their risks.9  His recent challenge to the Restatement of 
the Law Liability Insurance makes similar arguments about the 
potential impact of that project on insurance markets.10    
Scholars have persuasively criticized Professor Priest’s 
efforts on multiple grounds,  but none of those critiques took issue 
 
7 See Travis Pantin, Toward a Political Theory of Risk and Insurance (working paper 
2019). Cf., KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK (1986) (on fairness and efficiency in 
insurance pricing); and Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 
J. Health Policy Politics & L. 287 (1993) (criticizing the “actuarial fairness” vision of 
insurance that is similar to, but less developed than, Pantin’s preservative redistribution). 
8 See, e.g., Siegelman, supra note --- (explaining that adverse selection is “an exaggerated 
threat”); Baker, Genealogy, supra note -- (describing tools that insurers can use to manage 
moral hazard).  Put another way, the concern that moral hazard and adverse selection 
make insurance “reactive” and, thus, difficult to price typically operates under an 
assumption that there is some underlying determinable risk that can be fixed in advance 
if the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection can be addressed. 
9 See Priest, supra note 1, at 1561-3, 1574-78 (asserting that the expansion of product 
liability had increased the variance in liability insurance pools, relative to manufacturers’ 
ability to predict their risk, so that manufacturers now had greater private information 
about their risk than before, destabilizing the insurance market in the long term through 
an adverse selection unravelling of the liability insurance market). Following Hansmann, 
supra note 5, Priest used the mid-1980s expansion of mutual liability insurance 
organizations as evidence supporting his thesis.  Cf., Abraham, supra note 6 at XX 
(suggesting changes in environmental liability law to reduce uncertainty and promote 
insurance markets). 
10 George L. Priest, A Principled Approach Toward Insurance Law: The Economics of 
Insurance and the Current Restatement Project, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635 (2017). For a 
response, see Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, In Defense of the Restatement of Liability 
Insurance Law, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767 (2017).   
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with the underlying description of the insurance market, which 
remains the implicit consensus in legal writing.11  Even scholars 
who would recruit insurance markets to achieve redistributive or 
corrective justice ends in ways that Priest and the other “Yale 
lawyers” would surely regard as misguided12 share their 
description of insurance as, fundamentally, a market that sets 
prices for, and then distributes, determinable risks.13  So, too, for 
example, does the California Supreme Court.14 
There is just one field of research that seriously questions 
this description of insurance.  Researchers in a branch of sociology 
initiated in the early 1990’s by students of Michel Foucault have 
gone into the field and discovered insurance practices that are 
more varied and multi-faceted than simple loss distribution.15  
Legal scholarship has incorporated, and even extended, one of the 
 
11 For critiques of the insurance crisis article and the larger project to use insurance ideas 
to reduce tort liability, see, e.g., Jane Stapleton, Tort, Insurance and Ideology, 58 MOD. L. 
REV. 820, 843 (1995); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of 
Accidents: Pain and Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995); Jon 
D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic 
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990).   
12 Stapleton, supra note – at 837 (“Yale lawyers” is her term for George Priest, Alan 
Schwarz, and Richard Epstein).  See also id (“the “tort-as-insurance argument also 
generates a reform strategy which is radically redistributional whereby business is 
enriched and injured individuals are stripped of protection”). 
13 See, e.g., Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility after the Affordable 
Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2011); Allison Hoffman, Three Models of Health 
Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (2011); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative 
Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1 (2008).   
14 See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P. 2d 549 (Cal. 1991) (adopting a 
knowability standard for liability for failure on, inter alia, insurability grounds, quoting 
from Wade, supra note 6: “How does one spread the potential loss of an unknowable 
hazard? How can insurance premiums be figured for this purpose?”). 
15 The first significant results from this research reported in English appeared in GRAHAM 
BURCHELL, COLIN GORDON, PETER MILLER, EDS., THE FOUCAULT EFFECT (1991). A sample 
of the subsequent research includes the essays collected in RISK AND MORALITY (Richard 
Ericson & Aaron Doyle, eds., 2003); RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, 
INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003); Richard Ericson & Aaron Doyle, Catastrophe Risk, 
Insurance and Terrorism, 33 J. ECON. AND SOC’Y 135 (2004); PAT O’MALLEY, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY AND GOVERNMENT (2006); INE VAN HOYWEGHEN, RISKS IN THE MAKING: 
TRAVELS IN LIFE INSURANCE AND GENETICS (2007); LUIS LOBO-GUERRERO, INSURING WAR: 
SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND RISK (2012); Turo-Kimmo Lehtonen, Picturing How Life 
Insurance Matters, 7 J. CULTURAL ECON. 308 (2014); Philip D. Bougen, Catastrophe Risk, 
32 J. ECON. AND SOC’Y 253 (2003). Cf., Michael C. Behrent, Accidents Happen: François 
Ewald, the “Antirevolutionary” Foucault, and the Intellectual Politics of the French 
Welfare State, 82 J. OF MOD. HIST. 585 (2010); Jonathan Simon, The Emergence of a Risk 
Society - Insurance, Law and the State, SOCIALIST REV. 60, 60 n.* (1987) (“My interest in 
the social effects of risk management techniques was inspired by the work of Michel 
Foucault”). 
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central findings of this research: insurers often serve as private 
regulators of the people and entities that they insure, as 
illustrated most prominently in recent legal scholarship by John 
Rappaport’s investigation of how private insurers regulate public 
police.16  This “insurance as governance” idea fits easily in legal 
scholarship because it gives shape to the moral hazard 
management function of liability insurance posited in Steven 
Shavell’s influential early work on tort law and economics, and it 
helps explains how tort law’s noisy deterrence signals translate 
into loss prevention efforts on the ground.17 
Legal scholarship has not yet adequately acknowledged, 
however, let alone incorporated, a second major finding from this 
branch of sociological research: the ideal type of a fixed-in-
advance, distribution of determinable risks does not match the 
reality of insurance markets – not even in life insurance, which 
would be expected to be the paradigmatic example of this ideal 
type in action because of the availability of public and private 
mortality data going back hundreds of years.18  Everywhere they 
looked, the sociologists found insurance practices that deviated 
from this ideal type: insurance that went beyond the data, 
potential insured losses that could easily swamp the available 
assets of the industry, insured losses that defied prediction, and 
on-the-fly, after-the-sale adjustments to unforeseen 
circumstance.19  
This Article brings this second finding, and the challenge 
it poses, into legal scholarship while also extending the 
underlying qualitative empirical research, by investigating, for 
the first time in the scholarly literature in any field, the rise of 
 
16 See Rapaport, supra note 5.  See generally Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by 
Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412 
(2013). 
17 See Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120 (1982); Tom Baker 
& Peter Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Review, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer Arlen, ed., 2013). 
Cf. Kenneth Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 683-96 
(2013) (describing “insurance as governance” as one of the four conceptions of insurance).   
18 RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE AND THE 
LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE XX (2004) (re: life insurance). 
19 Id. See also Stapleton, supra note 11.  For an insightful, insurance-industry-insider 
account of the uncertainty that permeates the insurance business, see Sean M. Fitzpatrick, 
Fear is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 Conn. Ins. L. J. 255 (2004).  
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insurance runoff, a thriving sector of the insurance market whose 
raison d’etre has been managing losses that proved to be 
indeterminable.20 In combination with the sociological research 
just described, the research reported in this article challenges the 
descriptive accuracy of the prevailing insurance ideal type, as 
well as the legal and policy conclusions that depend on that 
descriptive accuracy, such as  recommendations to cut back on 
certain aspects of tort law so that liability and damages are more 
predictable and more recent suggestions  to expand cyber liability 
so that insurance prices will encourage people or businesses to 
engage in efficient loss prevention.21  Insurers may well try to 
price based on their best assessment of the frequency and severity 
of severity of future losses,22 but the sociological research provides 
so many reasons why insurers so rarely hit that pricing nail on 
the head that legal scholars should stop thinking and acting as if 
insurers regularly could do so.23  Instead, we should start learning 
 
20 Perhaps surprisingly, this Article is also the first examination in legal scholarship of the 
mergers and acquisitions side of the insurance industry.  Sean Griffith’s recent, notable 
research on representations & warranties insurance examines the emerging role of 
insurance in facilitating mergers and acquisitions, but not the M&A side of the insurance 
industry itself.  See, Sean Griffith, Deal Insurance: Representation & Warranty Insurance 
in Mergers & Acquisitions, 104 U. MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).  For legal and 
actuarial practitioner articles about insurance runoff, see, e.g., Jason L. Russ & Thomas 
A. Ryan, The Runoff Environment – Considerations for the Reserving Actuary, CASUALTY 
ACTUARIAL SOCIETY FORUM, Fall 2002 at 287-304, available at 
http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/02fforum/02ff287.pdf.;  David Whear and Bob Haken, 
Closing books of business: the challenge of fairness and finality, Research Handbook on 
International Insurance Law and Regulation 167; Stephen Carter, Bernadette Bailey 
&Tobey Butcher, Exit Strategies in the Run-Off Market, 56 FEDERATION OF DEFENSE & 
CORPORATE COUNSEL QUARTERLY 219, 221. 
21 For the former, see, e.g., Priest supra note 2.  For the latter, see, e.g. James C. Cooper 
and Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Unreasonable Solution: Rethinking the FTC’s Current 
Approach to Data Security (working paper 2019) (calling for strict liability for data 
breaches so that insurers can function as private regulators of cyber security.) 
22 See, e.g. Luis Lobo Guerero, supra note --.  Cf. Tom Baker and Sean Griffith, Predicting 
Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance 
Market, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487 (2007) (describing how Directors and Officers insurers 
attempt to price on the basis of risk). 
23 For examples of legal scholarship that treat tort law rules that make hitting that nail 
on the head more difficult as a problem that suggests lawmakers should do something, 
see, e.g., Priest, supra note 1; Mark Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and 
Tort Reform, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 539, 549 (2011) (describing the insurance underwriting 
cycle as the product of “forecasting errors” attributable to “legal ambiguity” and arguing 
that “the protection of individual tort rights in mass markets has led to a marked increase 
in legal ambiguity”); and, arguably, Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice 128 142-43 (2004) (describing how 
legal uncertainty poses a threat to the insurability of liability risks).     
  
31-Jan-20]   Uncertainty > Risk  8 
 
 
 
more about how insurers manage the uncertainty that the 
research reveals.   
The Article begins in Part I with an etymology of the word 
“runoff” as used in the insurance context to refer to the practice 
of winding down – running off – insurers’ obligations under their 
old insurance policies.  Then, in Part II the Article describes a 
thriving new market in those old obligations that first developed 
in the years following the most famous insurance runoff 
transaction in modern times: Lloyd’s Reconstruction and 
Renewal. This 1996 transaction reinsured all of Lloyd’s 
obligations under non-life policies issued before 1993 – most 
significantly asbestos, pollution and other toxic tort liabilities –  
into a newly formed entity, Equitas, designed to honor those 
obligations as they became due over the next fifty (or more) years, 
allowing Lloyd’s to continue as a major force in insurance 
markets.24   
Together with a set of similar transactions that took place 
at about the same time on this side of the Atlantic,25 the 
Reconstruction and Renewal set the stage for the consolidation of 
problematic, legacy insurance obligations in entities that do not 
sell new insurance policies.   More recently, this insurance runoff 
market has expanded beyond liability insurance to include other 
long-duration insurance products that have not worked out well 
for the insurance companies that sold them – workers 
compensation, savings-linked life insurance with guaranteed 
minimum returns, pension and annuity guarantees, financial 
guaranty insurance, and, most recently and tentatively, long-
term-care insurance – none of which, with the possible exception 
of long term care insurance, are in trouble because of the classic 
information problems of moral hazard or adverse selection.26  
 
24 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS EXAMINATION TEAM TO THE SURPLUS LINES (E) TASK 
FORCE, LLOYD’S: A REVIEW BY U.S. STATE INSURANCE REGULATORS 7 (1998), 
http://www.uniset.ca/lloydata/Lloyds_Report_Final_091498.pdf [hereinafter NAIC 
REPORT ON LLOYD’S]. 
25 LIABILITY-BASED RESTRUCTURING WORKING GROUP OF THE NAIC FINANCIAL CONDITION 
(EX4) SUBCOMMITTEE, LIABILITY-BASED RESTRUCTURING WHITE PAPER, § VII.A, June 
1997 1997 [hereinafter LBR WHITE PAPER]. 
26 See, e.g., PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, EUROPEAN LIFE INSURANCE BACK BOOK 
MANAGEMENT 2017 (2018), https://www.pwc.co.uk/audit-assurance/assets/pdf/european-
life-book-survey-2017.pdf (describing growth of life and annuity runoff transactions); Ben 
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The companies that assume and manage these legacy 
obligations serve as what we might call “uncertainty sinks,” 
extending a metaphor used by sociologists Richard Ericson and 
Aaron Doyle in their important monograph, The Uncertain 
Business.27  Using Knight’s distinction between risk and 
uncertainty,28 Ericson and Doyle showed how the limits of 
knowledge and the competitive nature of the insurance business 
push insurers beyond the domain of risk (where uncertain 
individual losses become predictable in the aggregate) into the 
domain of uncertainty (where losses are not predictable even in 
the aggregate).29  Insurance runoff transactions typically involve 
losses that, we now know, were uncertain in this larger, aggregate 
sense at the time the original insurance policies were sold. The 
insurance runoff market transforms those past uncertainties into 
today’s tradeable risks and transfers them to specialists – the 
uncertainty sinks – to manage.   
Part III of this Article describes how that transformation 
takes place.  This requires delving into some unavoidably 
technical subjects – runoff underwriting, policy management, 
asset management, and finance – that are the subject of the first 
half of Part III, which represents the first serious effort to explain 
the insurance runoff market to a general audience.  
Understanding the runoff market also, and perhaps more 
importantly, requires developing an appreciation for the role of 
rhetoric and organizational structure in this process.  Prior 
research has documented that “[i]insurance companies tell two 
different sets of stories about insurance at two distinct points in 
 
Gonson, Is Long-Term Health Care the Next Run-off? AIRROC Matters Winter 2016-17 at 
19; CNO Financial Group Form 8-K (September 27, 2018), 
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001224608/19ca2a33-9ee2-4a9a-8844-
2ecfd3b69506.pdf (reporting a $3.525 billion runoff transaction between Bankers Life and 
Casualty Company and Wilton Reassurance Company for legacy nursing home and 
comprehensive long-term care business). [Need a source for financial guaranty runoff; can 
use my MBIA report if can’t find something published].   
27 RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, THE UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE, 
AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE (2004).  Cf., JOEL A. TARR, THE SEARCH FOR THE ULTIMATE 
SINK: URBAN POLLUTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1996). 
28 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).  See also Geistfeld, supra 
note xx (explaining that legal ambiguity contributes to uncertainty in this sense). 
29 Ericson & Doyle, supra note xx at xx. 
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the insurance relationship”30 and that insurance companies 
minimize the potential for these “sales” and “claims” stories to 
come into direct conflict by separating the organizational 
responsibility for their narration.31  The sales stories stress the 
dependence of policyholders and the protection that insurance 
provides; the claims stories stress the contractual nature of the 
relationship and the limits of that insurance protection.32  As the 
second half of Part III describes for the first time, the runoff 
market features another set of stories, told by people in another 
organizational location.   
These runoff stories stress the burden that unforeseeable 
liabilities have placed on insurers, who were paid too little for 
accepting these obligations, and the need to relieve the insurance 
market from the drag on performance that otherwise would 
result.33  The runoff stories valorize finality, compromise, and 
innovation over the protection, dependence, and contract of the 
sales and claims stories.  If the sales stories help sell an important 
product that not enough people otherwise would buy, and the 
claims stories help people accept that insurance protection must 
have limits, then these runoff stories help people understand that 
insurance markets need room for after-the-fact accommodation 
and adjustment, and that there can be circumstances in which 
the insurance industry’s ordinary approach to promise and 
contract can be suspended, precisely to permit that ordinary 
approach to be maintained more generally.  
 
30 Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and 
Insurance Contract Damages, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1395 (1994) 
31 Id. at 1416-17. 
32 Compare Id. at 1404-05 (themes of dependency and trust) with id. at 1409 (themes of 
insurance as contract and the need to protect the insurance fund for the future and from 
fraudulent claims).  Note that there is another reason for separating the claims and 
underwriting departments that cuts in the other direction: underwriting could pressure 
the claims department to delay or deny certain claims in order to improve the 
underwriting ratio on a book of business.  Thank you to Sean Fitzpatrick for this 
observation. 
33 I am simply reporting the runoff stories at this point, not evaluating them.  There is an 
obvious alternative framing to the “paid too little” story.  Namely, the insurance company 
made a bad bet, and the policyholder did get what it paid for.  When the results work out 
the other way, and policyholders paid much more in premiums than the insurance 
company had to pay out, insurers do not offer to return the “extra” premiums.   
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The research reported in this Article provides significant 
new insight into how insurers use the runoff market to manage 
uncertainty.  Nevertheless, as I emphasize in Part IV, it is 
important not to exoticize insurance runoff transactions.  The 
dynamic that produced the insurance runoff market is as old as 
the insurance business.  Insurers have always extended 
protection against losses whose frequency and magnitude were 
unknown, whether by engaging in the obviously innovative act of 
creating a new insurance product to cover a new set of risks 
(happening with cyber and digital asset insurance today34), by 
revising a standard-form insurance policy, or, even, by continuing 
to sell exactly the same insurance policies in the real-world 
insurance market.  As Ericson and Doyle have shown, even 
selling a tried and true insurance policy into a well-established 
market can be a voyage into uncertainty, because of the 
dynamism of insurance markets and insured risks.35  Competition 
among insurers changes the shape of the insurance market, the 
creative destruction of the underlying insured activity changes 
the risks transferred in that market, and there is always the 
possibility of change in the governing legal rules.36  In practice, 
 
34 See, e.g., Tom Baker, Back to the Future of Cyber Insurance, Q3 2019 PLUS Journal 4, 
5 (2019) (providing preliminary answers to the question, “How have insurers managed for 
over twenty years to sell insurance against cyber risks that their underwriters don’t (and 
can’t) fully understand”); Adam Zuckerman [placeholder for his ms in progress on digital 
asset insurance].  Cf. Ericson & Doyle, supra note – at -- (describing how the insurance 
industry responded to the radically increased scale of potential terrorism losses revealed 
by 9/11); Dwight Jaffee and Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and 
Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. Risk & Ins. 205, 207 (1997) (describing how marine insurers 
historically addressed large, uncertain losses).  Jaffee and Russell’s accounts of how 
insurance markets manage uncertainty shows a more nuanced understanding of 
insurance than typically reflected in the law and economics literature.  See also Dwight 
Jaffee, Monoline Restrictions, with Applications to Mortgage Insurance and Title 
Insurance, 28 Rev. Indus. Org. 83 (2006) (explaining that monoline insurance manages 
cases of extreme loss through insolvency and that legal rules requiring certain kinds of 
insurance to be conducted through monoline insurance protect the larger insurance pool 
from that risk of extreme loss).  
35 Ericson & Doyle, supra note xx at 47 (“beneath the veneer of certainty, life insurance is 
a very uncertain business”). 
36 Id.; Baker, Insuring Liability Risks at – (discussing “legal developments risk”). Cf. KARL 
POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (Beacon Press 2001) (1944). 
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there is no such thing as the fixed-in-advance distribution of fully 
determinable risks.37  Insurance is an uncertain business.38 
It is time for legal thought to update its insurance ideas 
and metaphors, and its use of insurance practices, to this more 
realistic understanding of insurance.  Insurance markets always 
and everywhere trade in uncertainty, and insurance markets 
always and everywhere develop ways to transform that 
uncertainty into manageable risk.  With this more realistic 
understanding of insurance, legal thought can lessen its concern 
about the impact of legal change on insurance markets, even if we 
regard those markets as essential, because we can be more 
confident that those markets will manage through legal change.39     
The rise of insurance runoff suggests that we may have 
learned exactly the wrong lesson from the insurance industry’s 
harrowing asbestos and environmental liability experience.40  
That experience involved retroactive, strict liability for activities 
undertaken on a widespread basis for decades.  For asbestos 
miners and manufacturers, the unanticipated liabilities came 
from common law innovations in the 1960’s and 1970’s that made 
them liable for activities dating back to at least the 1940’s.41  For 
hazardous waste producers and transporters and for the owners 
of hazardous waste sites, the unanticipated liabilities came from 
statutory liabilities adopted in the early 1980’s that made them 
liable for activities that dated back even longer.42  These liabilities 
landed on liability insurers through the promises they made in 
insurance policies they sold to asbestos miners and 
manufacturers, hazardous wastes producers and transporters, 
and property owners dating back to the 1940’s – promises that 
 
37 See Sean Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 
Conn. Ins. L. J. 255, 260 (2004) (“the bottom line is that pricing uncertainty [is] … built 
into the very nature of insurance”). 
38 Ericson & Doyle, supra note xx. 
39 Cf., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, xxx (Cal. 1991) 
(explicitly structuring the warning defect aspect of product liability law so that it “rings of 
negligence” because truly strict liability would not be insurable, with a partial dissent 
from the last remaining justice from the Traynor era, Justice Stanley Mosk). 
40 Cf. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and 
Insurance Three Decades After Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J.349, 464-66 (2006). 
41 See, e.g., Borel v. Fiebreboard Paper Products, Corp., 493 F. 2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
42 See, Jonathan B. Weiner, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1458 (1986). 
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could not be repriced and for which the insurance industry had 
not anticipated anything like the extensive losses that resulted.43 
Those unanticipated insurance liabilities lead to massive losses 
for the leading liability insurance companies and, eventually, one 
of the most significant innovations in the liability insurance 
market in the 20th Century: the rise of insurance runoff.   
The right lesson to draw from this experience is not that 
insurance markets need legal certainty,44 but rather that 
insurance markets are resilient and innovative enough to handle 
even extreme legal uncertainties.  If the liability insurance 
market can absorb widespread, retroactive, and truly strict 
liability for asbestos injuries and the costs of cleaning up 
hazardous waste, then legal scholars, judges, and legislators can 
safely focus more on identifying the just distribution of legal 
rights and obligations and less on the destabilizing impact that 
moving toward that distribution might have on insurance 
markets.  Perhaps ironically, this more realistic understanding of 
insurance markets may hold the greatest promise within legal 
thought for scholars whose ideas least take markets into account, 
because they already have discounted any concerns that adopting 
their ideas would destabilize insurance markets. 
 
I. An Etymology of Insurance Runoff 
 
The insurance usage of “runoff” can be traced back at least 
as far as the 17th century marine insurance market at Lloyd’s 
coffee shop.45  At Lloyd’s, individual merchants agreed to 
underwrite a share of the risks of a voyage, in return for a share 
of the insurance premium.  They earned their share as soon as 
they “ran the risk,” meaning that the ship sailed.46  Once the 
voyage was over and any claims paid, the risk was fully “run” and 
 
43 See, e.g., Stempel, supra n. xx. 
44 Cf. Baker, supra note --; Abraham, supra note XX at 946-47; Geistfeld supra note --. 
45 CHARLES WRIGHT & C. ERNEST PYLE, A HISTORY OF LLOYD’S (1928) 
46 James A. Park, A system of the law of marine insurances: with three chapters, at 368 
(“The principle upon which the whole of this doctrine depends, is simple and plain, 
admitting of no doubt or ambiguity.  The risk or peril is the consideration for which the 
premium is to be paid: if the risk be not run, the consideration of the premium fails.”) 
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the potential liability came “off” the portion of the merchant’s 
ledger book that listed liabilities, with the difference between the 
premium and any claim payments recorded as profit or loss.47  
This accounting process became known as “running off” the risk, 
a feature of insurance accounting that continues today.48   
Over time, the underwriters working at Lloyd’s organized 
syndicates that underwrote risks for their members (including 
passive investors, known as Names) for a period of one year.  At 
the end of three years (the year in which policies were sold plus 
two years), a syndicate would close by reinsuring with a new 
syndicate all the risks that had not already run off and declaring 
and distributing the profit (or loss) to its members.49 This process 
became known as “reinsurance to close,” and the new syndicate 
that offered the reinsurance to close often included some or all of 
the same underwriters and names as the closing syndicate.50  The 
original syndicate retained a formal contractual relationship with 
the merchants it insured, but the reinsurance-to-close transaction 
assigned all the responsibilities for that relationship to the new 
syndicate.51  As long as that new syndicate fulfilled those 
responsibilities, the merchants who purchased insurance from 
Lloyd’s syndicates could safely remain oblivious to the opening 
and closing of the syndicates that issued the policies sold at 
Lloyd’s.   
Occasionally, a syndicate would be unable to reinsure to 
close, presumably because the underwriters and names were 
unwilling (or unable) to form a new syndicate that would reinsure 
the old syndicate to close, and they were unwilling (or unable) to 
pay the reinsurance-to-close premium demanded by other 
 
47 JOSEPH MARRYAT, ESQ. M.P., OBSERVATIONS UPON THE REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON MARINE INSURANCE, 50-51, 90 (1810). 
48 See, e.g., Jason L. Russ & Thomas A. Ryan, The Runoff Environment – Considerations 
for the Reserving Actuary, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOCIETY FORUM, 287 (2002), 
http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/02fforum/02ff287.pdf.  
49 NAIC  REPORT ON LLOYD’S at 5.  
50 Id. at 5, 18, 22-23 (describing the three-year accounting system, reinsurance-to-close, 
and the security of tenure of Names in their respective syndicate). To be clear, there would 
be no dollar limit on the reinsurance to close. 
51 Id. 
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syndicates.52  Such syndicates remained “open,” and they could 
not close until all the risks had run off or they found a syndicate 
willing to reinsure to close at a price that the members were able 
and willing to pay.53  The only business of a syndicate that 
remained open after three years, then, was running off the risks 
and seeking reinsurance to close.  The open syndicate was said to 
be “in runoff,” a use of that term that continues through today.54  
By at least the 19th century, the concept of runoff and its 
association with reinsurance were accepted aspects of insurance 
market practice generally, not just at Lloyds.55   Like the open 
syndicates at Lloyd’s, insurers that stopped underwriting entirely 
were said to be in runoff, and when an insurer stopped 
underwriting in a market, whether defined geographically or by 
type of insurance, that part of the insurer’s business was said to 
be in runoff as well.  As at Lloyd’s, one insurance company might 
agree to take over the business of another through a reinsurance 
transaction in which the acquiring insurer reinsured the risks in 
runoff.56   
 
II. The Lloyd’s Renewal and Reconstruction 
 
Lloyd’s continued to operate on this traditional basis into 
the mid-1990s.57  As a formal matter, Lloyd’s became a 
membership organization whose members participated in 
syndicates that issued insurance policies.58  Neither Lloyd’s itself 
 
52 For example, a member of the syndicate who has declared bankruptcy or is insolvent 
would have no interest in paying additional premiums to close a syndicate.  And since the 
other members are liable only for their shares, they wouldn’t have the same incentive to 
reinsure to close that they would have if they had full liability.   
53 Carolyn Aldred, Lloyd’s to Make First Claim on Central Fund’s Cover; Claim will 
Exhaust Reinsurance Program’s Annual Limit, BUS. INSIDER., Aug. 12, 2002, at 17 
(describing a “surge” in open years at Lloyd’s following the September 11 attacks). 
54 See, e.g., Wright and Fayle, supra note xx. NAIC  REPORT ON LLOYD’S at 5. 
55 See, e.g., City of London Marine Insurance Corporation, Limited, Reports of Meetings, 56 
THE MONEY MARKET REVIEW, 266, 266 (1888) (reporting amounts underwritten, “run off 
or reinsured,” and remaining liabilities). 
56 Lee R. Steeneck, Loss Portfolios: Financial Reinsurance, 72 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOCIETY, 154, 156 (1985) (providing history of loss portfolio 
transfers and describing a 16th century transaction). 
57 NAIC  REPORT ON LLOYD’S at 7. 
58 Id. As described in Wright & Fayle, supra note xx at 422-23, it was not until the 
incorporation of Lloyds’ in 1871 that Lloyd’s formally adopted different rules for members 
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nor any other corporate entity was financially responsible for the 
payment of claims.59  Instead, Lloyd’s was a central 
administrative apparatus that managed claims but had no formal 
financial obligation for those claims.60  In form, the Lloyd’s 
administration simply connected policyholders with the 
syndicates, which were composed of individuals, that issued their 
policies. The “Names” in the syndicates had unlimited liability, 
but only for their share of the obligations of their syndicates, not 
for the syndicate as a whole.61   
Traditionally, the Lloyd’s administration managed that 
unlimited liability through the reinsurance-to-close transaction 
just described.62  Because of mounting asbestos and 
environmental liability and catastrophic property losses on 
policies written in the 1980s and earlier, however, an increasing 
number of syndicates faltered in the 1980s and were unable to 
find a newer syndicate to reinsure their obligations, thus 
remaining open syndicates.63  Names, many of whom only 
recently participated in Lloyd’s for the first time as Lloyd’s 
broadened its membership starting in the late 1970s, were hit 
with severe losses, in many cases several times their initial 
investment.64 Names began to default in mass (de facto if not de 
jure), undermining confidence in the Lloyd’s market.65  Warren 
Buffett colorfully described this process as follows in his 2006 
Letter to Shareholders: 
 
Eventually, the names came to include 
many thousands of people from around the world, 
who joined expecting to pick up some extra change 
without effort or serious risk. True, prospective 
 
who directly engaged in underwriting and the “Names” who were passive members of the 
syndicate and interacted with Lloyd’s through an agent.  supplied capital but  
59 Id. at 4 (“Lloyd’s is a market, not an insurer.”). 
60 Id. at 5, 19-22.   
61 Id. at 8.  
62 Id. at 5.   
63 Lawrence Ingrassia & Dana Milbank, Market at Risk:  Hit by Huge Losses, Lloyd’s of 
London Struggles to Survive—Insurance Exchange Seeks to Raise Money and End 
Disputes with Investors, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1995, at A1.     
64 Ingrassia & Milbank, supra note --. 
65 Id.   
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names were always solemnly told that they would 
have unlimited and everlasting liability for the 
consequences of their syndicate’s underwriting – 
“down to the last cufflink,” as the quaint 
description went. But that warning came to be 
viewed as perfunctory. Three hundred years of 
retained cufflinks acted as a powerful sedative to 
the names poised to sign up. 
Then came asbestos. When its prospective 
costs were added to the tidal wave of 
environmental and product claims that surfaced in 
the 1980s, Lloyd’s began to implode. Policies 
written decades earlier – and largely forgotten 
about – were developing huge losses. No one could 
intelligently estimate their total, but it was certain 
to be many tens of billions of dollars. The specter of 
unending and unlimited losses terrified existing 
names and scared away prospects. Many names 
opted for bankruptcy; some even chose suicide. 
From these shambles, there came a 
desperate effort to resuscitate Lloyd’s. In 1996, the 
powers that be at the institution allotted £11.1 
billion to a new company, Equitas, and made it 
responsible for paying all claims on policies written 
before 1993. In effect, this plan pooled the misery 
of the many syndicates in trouble. Of course, the 
money allotted could prove to be insufficient – and 
if that happened, the names remained liable for the 
shortfall.66 
 
This “desperate effort” was known as Lloyd’s 
Reconstruction and Renewal.67  Through a series of transactions 
scrutinized and then approved by the UK Department of Trade 
and Industry and acquiesced in by U.S. regulators, underwriters, 
Names and their agents paid a reinsurance premium, and 
Equitas agreed to receive, process, and pay any claims on the 
reinsured legacy business, subject only to the terms and 
 
66 Chairman’s Letter to Shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2006 Annual Report at 9, 
https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2006ar/2006ar.pdf.  
67 For a high-level, insider description of the R&R, see Mike Palmer, The Deal of the 
Decade, AIRROC MATTERS Summer 2007 at 30.  See also Lloyd’s Reconstruction and 
Renewal Byelaw https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/the-market/operating-at-
lloyds/regulation/acts-and-
byelaws/byelaws/march07byelawreconstructionandrenewal_pdf.pdf 
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conditions of the original insurance policies and without regard 
to the total costs that Equitas might be obligated to pay.68 In 
effect, Equitas issued a massive reinsurance-to-close policy 
covering obligations under all policies issued before 1993.  
By reinsuring all old business into Equitas (except for life 
insurance, which could not be reinsured as Equitas did not qualify 
as a life insurer under English law), Lloyd’s effectively created 
Equitas to function as an “old Lloyd’s” comprised of all pre-1993 
business.  Equitas was separate from the “new Lloyd’s,” which 
would house the on-going and active syndicates for years 1993 
and beyond.69  The Lloyd’s restructuring separated the legacy 
business from Lloyd’s ongoing business, improving the 
syndicates’ ability to continue selling insurance. 
To the extent that Equitas simply reinsured the old, open 
syndicates to close, Lloyd’s Reconstruction and Renewal could be 
seen to differ from Lloyd’s traditional runoff arrangements only 
in scale.  Yet it also differed significantly in kind.  First, by 
reinsuring to close all the open syndicates into a single entity, 
Equitas facilitated a broader socialization of losses among the 
Names than the individualized, syndicate-by-syndicate 
reinsurance-to-close process.  Second, Equitas did not simply 
reinsure to close all the old open syndicates.  Equitas also 
reinsured the pre-1993 liabilities of the syndicates that had been 
able to reinsure to close, thereby taking those legacy liabilities off 
the books of any active syndicates.70 This meant that the Equitas 
 
68 NAIC REPORT ON LLOYD’S 10, 51-54; Lisa S. Howard, Lutine Bell Tolls Relief for Lloyd’s, 
NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 9, 1996, at 1 (stating that the NYID had approved the transfer 
of $5.5 billion from the LATF into Equitas). 
69 Equitas Receives Go-Ahead, BUS. WIRE, Sept. 4, 1996. The contractual mechanism by 
which policies were reinsured into Equitas defined and separated every existing 
syndicate’s policy liabilities into two groups based upon whether the policy which could 
incur a liability was written during or before the 1992 year of account.  See Reinsurance 
and Run-off Contract between Equitas Reinsurance, Ltd., Additional Underwriting 
Agencies (No. 9), Ltd., The Names, The Closed Year Names, The Society of Lloyd’s, 
Equitas, Ltd., The Managing Agent’s Trustees, and Equitas Policyholders Trustee, Ltd., 
at § 3.2, pp. 5-6, Schedule 2, p. 55 (Sept. 3, 1996),. [comment – link?] 
70 Disappointed policyholders that previously had been protected by reinsurance to close 
could not proceed against those active syndicates, because Lloyd’s reinsurance to close 
transactions (like reinsurance generally) obligate the reinsuring syndicate to manage the 
liabilities for the benefit of the original syndicate; they do not give the policyholder of the 
original syndicate any rights directly against a syndicate that provided reinsurance to 
close. 
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transaction split the liabilities of the 1993 and later syndicates, 
many of which carried liabilities for pre-1993 policies that had 
been reinsured-to-close.71  Finally, unlike the prior entities that 
had offered reinsurance to close, Equitas went into runoff at 
inception, so there was never a possibility that profits from the 
active business could help pay claims under the old policies.   
As Buffett’s letter described, the Lloyd’s/Equitas 
transaction did not, as a formal matter, legally separate the 
legacy obligations from the ongoing business.  Policyholders could 
still legally proceed against the original syndicates and, if the 
syndicates did not pay, assess the names individually for any 
deficiency not paid by Equitas.72  Yet, because of the unique form 
of Lloyd’s business – in which the contractual obligations of the 
syndicates that issued the insurance policies reduce to pro rata 
obligations of the individual members of the syndicates rather 
than an insurance company with a permanent life – it was 
understood that collecting from the syndicates at some uncertain 
point in the future would be unlikely.73  Many Names in the older 
syndicates already were deceased, with their estates already 
probated, and, thus, no longer a potential source of funds, and 
many more would be deceased by the time that Equitas ran out 
of money (if it ever did).  Moreover, the Names that remained at 
that time would be living all over the world and, in many if not 
most cases, out of reach without the cooperation of the Lloyd’s 
administration, which appears to have decided that, with respect 
to the liabilities of the names who participated in Equitas, it has 
done everything necessary to protect policyholders by creating 
Equitas.74 This de facto legal separation became de jure when 
 
71 Responsibility for managing the claims of policyholders insured under old policies that 
had already been reinsured-to-close into post-1992 syndicates were transferred to Equitas 
while policyholders insured under new policies covered by those same post-1992 
syndicates remained under Lloyd’s direct care. See Reinsurance and Run-off Contract, 
supra note xx at xx. 
72 NAIC REPORT ON LLOYD’S at 53-54; David L. Foster, Equitas and the New Lloyd’s:  
Practical Implications for Policyholders, Brokers, and Reinsurers, METRO. CORP. 
COUNSEL, May 1997, at 10.   
73 NAIC REPORT ON LLOYD’S 53-54; Stacy Shapiro, Policyholders Called Key to Lloyd’s 
Future, BUS. INSIDER., June 5, 1995, at 42. 
74 Cf. Stephanie Strom, The Financial Safety Net Is Almost Spread Beneath Lloyd’s; But 
Questions Persist on Risks of Reinsurance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996, at D1 
(“If Equitas cannot ultimately fulfill a claim, a policyholder would have to sue each of the 
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subsequently enacted legislation pre-empted contract law in this 
case and permitted the transfer of liabilities from the issuing 
syndicates to Equitas without the acquiescence of policyholders, 
provided that the U.K. High Court of Justice approved the 
transaction.75  The High Court did so in 2009, completing the legal 
separation of the obligations under the pre-1993 Lloyd’s policies 
from the syndicates that issued or reinsured them.76   
Along with a set of similar insurance company 
restructuring transactions that took place in the U.S. at about the 
same time, Lloyd’s Reconstruction and Renewal paved the way 
for runoff to become a distinct sector of the insurance market.77  
These U.S. transactions included: the restructuring of the 
property and casualty business of CIGNA through a series of 
transactions that culminated in the formation of a runoff entity 
known as Brandywine in 1995; the restructuring of the Crum & 
Forster Group in 1993 that facilitated the exit of Crum & 
Forster’s then parent, Xerox, from the insurance business; the 
restructuring of ITT-Hartford in 1992 that placed several 
Hartford subsidiaries into runoff and facilitated the exit of ITT 
from the insurance business; and the 1994 restructuring and 
eventual winding down of The Home, pursuant to which Zurich 
Insurance Group acquired the valuable parts of The Home’s 
business.78    
These transactions became known as the asbestos, 
pollution, and health hazard (“APH”) liability-based 
restructurings.79  They paved the way for a broader separation of 
legacy APH obligations from the active parts of the property and 
casualty insurance industry.  Since the 1990s, an increasingly 
 
names who had underwritten the policy, some of which date back three decades. That 
would be a daunting, if not outright impossible, task, given Lloyd's reputation for spotty 
record-keeping.”) 
75 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Title VII, §111 
76 In the matter of The Names at Lloyd’s for the 1992 and Prior Years of Account, 
represented by Equitas Limited and In the matter of Equitas Insurance Limited (Formerly 
known as Speyford Limited) and In the matter of Part VII of The Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, [2009] EWHC 1595 (Ch). 
77 NAIC LPT White Paper, supra note xx. 
78 Id. at Appendix 1.  See also, Jonathan Rosen, The Home Insurance Company – A Brief 
History of Time, AIRROC MATTERS Summer 2011 at 6. 
79 NAIC WHITE PAPER, Part I. 
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large percentage of legacy APH obligations have come to be 
managed by runoff specialists, most prominently by Berkshire 
Hathaway’s National Indemnity Company (commonly known as 
NICO).80 NICO reinsured all of Equitas’s liabilities in 2006 in 
return for acquiring all of Equitas’s assets (hence, Buffett’s 
discussion of Lloyd’s in his 2006 letter), and it reinsured APH 
obligations of, among other insurance groups, INA (now part of 
Chubb), CNA, AIG, Liberty Mutual, and The Hartford through 
conceptually similar transactions.81   Other active runoff 
specialists with significant stakes in APH obligations as of 2019 
include Armour, Catalina, Enstar, CompRe, and Randall & 
Quilter.82  The insurance industry’s asbestos and environmental 
liability experience is not over, but the center of gravity has 
shifted decidedly toward the runoff specialists, and the share of 
liability insurers’ reserves represented by asbestos and 
environmental liabilities is trending steadily down.83  
 
III. Insurance Runoff:  Mechanics and Stories 
 
With the growth of the APH insurance runoff market came 
a cadre of experienced managers of runoff businesses, trade 
associations, and practice groups in accounting and law firms 
that specialize in the acquisition and solvent runoff of legacy 
obligations of insurers, initially focusing on property casualty 
 
80 See NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, FINANCIAL EXAMINATION REPORT OF 
NATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY (May 23, 2018) at 17-19 (listing transactions); Tim 
Zawacki, Berkshire Unit's Retroactive Reinsurance Biz Expands with Ironshore Cover, 
S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 5, 2007), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/trending/l_vjh8pgbqn8dg8zhsegzw2 
81 See, e.g., Chairman’s Letter to Shareholders, supra note --. Berkshire Hathaway’s 
insurance investments include a huge stake in insurance runoff. See Nebraska 
Department of Insurance Financial Examination Report, supra note -Cf., Mark Roe, 
Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the Insurance Industry, 93 
COLUM L. REV. 684 (1993).   
82 See Survey of Discontinued Insurance Business in Europe, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2015) https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/insurance/assets/pdf/survey-of-discontinued-
insurance-ninth-edition-report.pdf (listing runoff market highlights from the prior year).  
Leading life runoff specialists include Berkshire Hathaway Life, Swiss Re, and Wilton Re. 
83 See Best’st Market Segment Report, No Slowdown in Asbestos and Environmental 
Claims, (November 28, 2018) at p. 3, and Exhibit 6 (“The P/C insurance industry’s A&E 
reserve has declined steadily since 2005”) and Best’s Aggregate and Averages (Property 
Casualty Edition) 2019 (reporting consistent increases in the P/C insurance industry’s 
overall liability insurance reserves). 
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lines of insurance but then expanding to life and health insurance 
lines.84  There had long been a need for insurance transactions 
and procedures that facilitate the, relatively infrequent, runoff of 
insolvent insurance companies.85  What was new was the 
extension and expansion of that transactional practice into the 
much larger field of solvent insurance runoff.   
Prior field research on the insurance business has focused 
on the “determinable risks” aspect of the prevailing ideal type, 
showing that life, disability, property, and liability insurers 
regularly provide insurance against uncertain risks.86  That 
research has not, however, addressed the “fixed in advance” 
aspect of the ideal type, except to note that insolvency produces 
an (extreme) after-the-fact adjustment of what was sold as fixed-
in-advance risk distribution.87 Selling insurance for uncertain 
risks requires some room for such adjustments, and prior 
research by insurance economists has identified some important 
methods, such as mutual insurance arrangements that permit 
post-loss assessments and organizing particularly uncertain risks 
into monoline insurers that are designed to go insolvent when an 
extreme event occurs.88 This study reveals another, more widely 
applicable method for making after-the-fact adjustments that 
operates outside of insolvency and without post loss assessments.   
In this section I describe the mechanics of runoff 
transactions, with a focus on how the insurance runoff process 
transforms uncertain losses into tradable risks.  I first explain 
how runoff transactions are structured.  Then I explain at a very 
high level the underwriting process through which these 
transactions are priced, the policy management process through 
which the liabilities are run off, and some key features of the 
finance and asset management functions of insurance runoff 
 
84 See David Whear and Bob Haken, Closing Books of Business: the Challenge of Fairness 
and Finality, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW AND 
REGULATION 167, 168 (Julian Burling & Kevin Lazarus, eds., 2012). 
85 Cf. SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 101ST CONG., FAILED 
PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES (Comm. Print 1990). 
86 See, e.g., Ericson & Doyle, supra note xx; Baker, Cyber Insurance, supra note XX. 
87 See, e.g., Ericson & Doyle, supra note 5 at 180 (discussing the potential insolvency of 
the British Columbia earthquake fund in the case of a major event) 
88 See Hannsman, supra note 6 (on monoline insurance); Jaffee & Thomas, supra note xx 
(on monoline insurers). 
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specialists.  With those mechanics explained, I turn to the runoff 
stories that the specialists use to explain and justify the 
separation of legacy liabilities from the active side of an insurer’s 
business and the tough bargaining that can be a feature of 
running off these legacy liabilities 
Before diving in, there are three important caveats.   
First, although the description that follows is drawn from 
insurance trade literature and other public sources whenever 
possible, it also draws on confidential interviews and email 
exchanges with participants in the runoff insurance market 
(actuaries, underwriters, consultants, claims professionals, 
lawyers, and industry analysts) and observation in a variety of 
runoff-related events that I cannot describe publicly, other than 
to note that they included off-the-record industry workshops. 
Because of the small, tight network of participants in the runoff 
insurance market, providing more detailed descriptions of the 
people I interviewed or observed would reveal their identities.  As 
with all qualitative research, this Article cannot provide 
conclusive evidence regarding the prevalence or extent of the 
practices observed, though it can help motivate and frame 
quantitative research that may provide that evidence.89  In the 
meantime, the persuasive power of this research depends, like 
traditional doctrinal and policy arguments, on the reader’s 
response to the coherence and plausibility of the analysis.90 
Second, because the insurance runoff business is so 
technical, any reasonably accurate explanation of the mechanics 
 
89 For example, quantitative research by Katherine Zeiler et al, Physician Insurance 
Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003 – J. 
EMP. LEG. STUD. – (2008?) confirmed a hypothesis developed in Tom Baker, Blood Money, 
New Money and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 314 
(2001), quantitative research by Jonathan Klick and Catherine Sharkey, The Fungibility 
of Damages Awards: Punitive Damages Caps and Substitution 
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912256) confirmed a hypothesis 
developed in Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment Into Compensation: In the Shadow of 
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211, and quantitative research by Blakeley McShane 
et al, Predicting Securities Fraud Settlements and Amounts: A Hierarchical Bayesian 
Model of Federal Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 9 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 482 (2012, 
confirmed hypotheses developed in Tom Baker and Sean Griffith, How the Merits Matter: 
Directors and Officers Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 101 
(2010). 
90 Tom Baker and Sean Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the 
Director’s and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 492 (2007). 
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of insurance runoff may be tough going for readers without a 
background or strong interest in insurance finance or mergers 
and acquisitions.  Those readers who do not have that interest or 
experience may want to skip ahead to the section on insurance 
runoff stories, which begins with a brief summary of what really 
matters about runoff mechanics.  
Third, this Article focuses on the runoff market as it 
developed to manage what some in the runoff business would 
describe as “failures” – liabilities under legacy policies that 
turned out to vastly exceed what underwriters had expected.91 
Increasingly, the runoff market includes transactions in policies 
that did not turn out to be so unsuccessful for the underwriters, 
but the parties to the transactions believe, for whatever reason, 
that these policies are better managed by a different insurer than 
the one that issued them.92  Reasons include the issuing insurer’s 
decision to focus its business in one region rather than another, 
one type of insurance rather than another, or one category of 
customer rather than another, perhaps in response to change in 
management of the insurance company or the legal or regulatory 
environment.93  I focus in this Article on the runoff of the failures 
because those transactions best evidence the resilience of 
insurance markets and the mechanism for transforming 
uncertainty into tradeable risk. 
 
A.  Insurance runoff mechanics 
 
The starting point for understanding the structure of 
insurance runoff transactions is the legal rule that one insurer 
may not assign an insurance policy to another insurer (or anyone 
else) without the consent of the policyholder.94  One insurer may 
 
91 Charles Ehrlich, Why Are We Here?, AIRROC MATTERS, Summer 2015 at 20 
92 See June 24, 2019 email  
93 Id. 
94 Countries in Europe typically permit the outright sale of books of insurance policies, 
subject to regulatory approval. See International Bar Association, Insurance Portfolio 
Transfers: “Move On and Let Go,” (2010) (survey of jurisdictional practices regarding 
insurance portfolio transfers); Sidley, PART VII TRANSFERS EFFECTED PURSUANT 
TO THE UK FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT 2000 (2019) available at: 
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/publications/part-vii-transfers.pdf.   There is effort 
underway in the U.S. to make such transactions permissible in the U.S.  See Matthew 
Gendron, Rhode Island’s Voluntary Restructuring of Solvent Insurers Law and Similar 
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contract with another insurer to fulfill the first insurer’s 
obligations under an insurance policy, but the obligation to 
perform remains that of the first insurer, unless the policyholder 
consents to transfer that obligation to the second insurer.  If the 
second insurer fails to perform, the policyholder sues the first 
insurer, not the second (assuming, as is almost always the case in 
the property casualty insurance context, that there was not a 
consensual transfer).  This insurance law rule contrasts with the 
legal rule governing credit contracts, which are freely 
assignable.95 
Because policyholder consent to transfer is difficult to 
obtain, especially at scale, an insurance group in in the property 
casualty sector in the United States can terminate its obligations 
under a set of insurance policies as a practical matter only if (a) 
it sold the policies through a separately incorporated subsidiary 
that it now can sell to another insurance group, or (b) it can divide 
the entity that sold the policies into two or more legally separate 
parts and sell the part of that entity that holds the policies in 
question.96  The latter option is not available in most U.S. states, 
and, because of the regulatory scrutiny required, it is not widely 
used in those jurisdictions in which it is available (e.g. 
Pennsylvania).97  When there is a separately incorporated entity, 
the contractual relationship is between the policyholders and that 
entity, not the corporate group under whose brand the entity 
operated and, thus, the entity can be sold without violating the 
insurance law rule against assigning insurance policies.  Once 
approved by the regulatory authority with jurisdiction over the 
entity, the sale gives the buyer complete control over that entity, 
 
Efforts in Other States, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 470 (2018). Analysis of the merits 
of that legislation is outside the scope of this Article. 
95 See, e.g. MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON, MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION LAW AND POLICY  
96 See Bailey & Butcher, supra note 20. 
97 See, Gendron, supra note 94.  
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subject only to compliance with legal requirements, and it gives 
the seller a “clean exit” from the liabilities of that entity.98    
Life and health insurers have greater opportunity to 
transfer a set of policies from one company to another, using a 
transaction known as “assumption reinsurance” (a confusing 
term for what amounts to the sale of a block of policies with the 
“consent” – sometimes constructive – of each policyholder).99  
Typically, policyholders in the life insurance sector have an 
ongoing obligation to pay premiums and, thus, an ongoing 
relationship with their insurance company.  After the sale of the 
assumption reinsurance to the insurer that issued the policies, 
the assuming reinsurer (in substance, the purchaser of the block 
of policies) obtains consent from the policyholders to the transfer 
of the policies to the reinsurer through the process of collecting 
premiums on renewal or, in some states, through a special notice 
procedure in which policyholders are deemed to consent if they do 
not object.100  
All other runoff market transactions involving policies 
issued in the U.S. must use reinsurance that is similar to the 
reinsurance-to-close used at Lloyd’s.  This reinsurance does not 
terminate the insurer’s obligations under the policies that are the 
subject of the transaction. At most, it provides the insurer with 
financial protection from its liabilities under those policies, and 
 
98 CATALINA, https://www.catalinare.com/market-issues-and-why-to-sell/ (last visited 
February 1, 2020) (“Selling to Catalina allows businesses to refocus on core activities, 
unlock capital, reduce costs and have a clean exit from liabilities.”).  Note that there may 
remain some uncertainty about whether all future courts will honor the legal distinction 
between the subsidiary that issued the insurance and the parent that later sold the 
subsidiary. 
99 JOHN E. TILLER AND DENISE FAGERBERG TILLER, LIFE, HEALTH AND ANNUITY 
REINSURANCE (4th ed.) 437 (2015).  A cynic might conclude that the practitioners refer to 
the transaction as “reinsurance” to obscure the fact that the transaction teminates the 
original insurer’s legal obligation. 
100 Id. Tiller & Tiller note that the legal rules regarding assumption reinsurance are 
sufficiently uncertain, and the prospect that at least some policyholders will object 
sufficiently likely, that assumption reinsurance transactions typically are structured in 
the alternative as indemnity coinsurance transactions.  As a result, the practical 
differences between the runoff transaction structures that are possible in the life 
insurance sector and in the property casualty sector are less that would appear in theory. 
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the degree of that protection varies considerably depending on the 
terms of the deal.   
The most common form of reinsurance-based runoff 
market transaction in the property casualty sector is called a “loss 
portfolio transfer,” or LPT.101 An LPT has two main parts: (1) a 
retroactive reinsurance contract in which the original insurer 
pays a large premium in return for the runoff specialist’s 
agreement to pay claims under a designated set of legacy 
insurance policies, up to a total dollar amount known as the 
reinsurance limit; and (2) a management contract in which the 
runoff specialist agrees to manage these policies on the original 
insurer’s behalf, unless and until the losses incurred under the 
policies exceed the reinsurance limit.102  If the losses paid under 
those policies exceed that reinsurance limit, the responsibility for 
paying claims and otherwise managing the legacy policies reverts 
to the original insurer, as has occurred in the case of a transaction 
involving Berkshire Hathaway’s NICO and the oldest 
continuously operating property casualty company in the U.S.: 
the Insurance Company of North America, later known as “INA” 
and now owned by the Chubb insurance group.103  This residual 
liability distinguishes an LPT from the “insurance portfolio 
transfer” permitted in Europe (under close regulatory 
 
101 Neil Bruce et al, Loss Portfolio Transfers: 2002 GIRO Working Party Paper (analyzing 
LPT arrangements for the General Insurance Research Organization of the Institute and 
Faculty of Actuaries in the U.K.); Derek A. Jones, An 
Introduction to Reserving and Financial Reporting Issues for Non-Traditional 
Reinsurance, 2004 CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOCIETY FORUM, Fall 2004 (available at 
http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/04fforum/) (discussing LPTs as one of the “most 
common retroactive reinsurance arrangements”); National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, Issue Paper no. 137 – Transfer of Property and Casualty Reinsurance 
Agreements in Run-Off (Exposure Draft, June 13, 2009) (addressing the accounting 
treatment of “reinsurance run-off agreements,” which is another term for an LPT 
reinsurance agreement and noting that such agreements often “must be approved by the 
domicilary regulators of the transferring entity”).   
102 See Bruce et al, supra note -- 
103 See Sallie B. Kraus, Looking Back and Forward on Asbestos Claims, 27 ENV. CLAIMS J. 
149 (2015) (reporting that the NICO-Brandywine agreement was exhausted on an 
incurred basis in 2002 and on a paid basis in 2013). 
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supervision), in which the transaction terminates the original 
insurer’s legal obligations.104 
Because an LPT does not legally separate the runoff book 
from the rest of the original insurer’s assets and liabilities, this 
form of insurance runoff transaction leaves the original insurer 
exposed to two kinds of risk that are not present when an 
insurance group sells a legally separate entity: counterparty 
credit risk (the risk that the reinsurer will go insolvent) and the 
risk that the total liabilities will exceed the limit of reinsurance. 
The original insurer can mitigate the latter risk by also 
purchasing another form of reinsurance known as “adverse 
development cover,” which provides additional reinsurance in the 
event that the loss portfolio transfer reinsurance limit is 
exhausted.105  Of course, that adverse development cover is 
subject to its own credit risk and the risk that the limit will be 
exhausted. 
The equivalent transaction in the life sector is called 
“indemnity coinsurance.”106 Key differences between a typical 
indemnity coinsurance transaction and a typical LPT transaction 
include the following: indemnity coinsurance often leaves the 
original insurer with an identified share of the risk, twenty 
percent being typical; indemnity coinsurance rarely sets a limit 
on the reinsurance company’s exposure for its share of the risk 
 
104 See International Bar Association, Insurance Portfolio Transfers: “Move On and Let 
Go,” (2010) (survey of jurisdictional practices regarding insurance portfolio transfers). 
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=CC04FD0A-63F5-42C1-
B0AA-8CB11FAA6B62 
There is a movement to permit similar transactions in the U.S.  See Gendron, supra note 
xx. 
105 Eleni Iacovides, The Legacy Market, AIRROC MATTERS, Spring 2017, at 16.  Note that 
property casualty insurers also can purchase adverse development cover instead of an 
LPT.  In that case, the insurer retains day to day responsibility for the runoff, and the 
adverse development cover simply provides protection (up to the limit of the cover) from 
liabilities that exceed the insurer’s reserves.  
106 For a description of indemnity coinsurance, see Jeremy Starr, Use of Reinsurance in 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 25 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES No. 
1, https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/library/proceedings/record-of-the-society-of-
actuaries/1990-99/1999/january/rsa99v25n171pd.pdf.  See Maryann Taylor, The Life Deal 
Market, AIRROC Matters, Winter 2018-19, at 29 (noting that indemnity coinsurance is 
the most common form of life runoff transaction). For a description of the various forms of 
reinsurance-based life runoff structures see TILLER AND TILLER, supra note XX at 175- 92 
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that is reinsured; and the original insurer more often retains the 
responsibility for administering the policies.107  
In whatever way a runoff specialist acquires the runoff 
liabilities – by buying entities or through an LPT or insurance 
portfolio transfer or through the life insurance equivalents – the 
specialist’s core business consists of four activities that are part 
of any insurance enterprise but have special features in the runoff 
context: underwriting, policy management, asset management, 
and finance.  The sections that follow provide a basic description 
of these activities and their role in making uncertainty tradeable. 
 
1.  Underwriting.   
 
Underwriting is the process of deciding whether to offer 
(re)insurance and, if so, at what price.  Underwriting the runoff 
of a book of insurance policies differs from underwriting the 
initial sale or prospective reinsurance of insurance policies in 
both the nature of the information on which the transaction is 
based and the scale of the transaction.  A runoff transaction 
represents a wholesale repricing of an entire book of legacy 
business with the benefit of hindsight – i.e., all the information 
about the liabilities covered by the policies learned in the years 
since the policies initially were sold.   
The runoff underwriting process consists of estimating 
inputs to a valuation formula: 
 
(1) a projection of cash outflows for the book of policies;   
(2) a projection of offsetting cash inflows from any 
reinsurance that the insurer previously purchased to 
support that book and, in the case of life and health 
products, cash inflows from any premiums and 
 
107 Interview (May 18, 2019). Indemnity coinsurance in which the ceding insurer retains 
the administrative responsibility is more similar to what is called adverse development 
cover in the property casualty context, with the key difference being the way that the risk 
is shared. Indemnity coinsurance is a quota share transaction, with the reinsurer taking 
100% of the designated share; adverse development cover is an excess of loss transaction 
with a cap that leaves the extreme right tail risk with the ceding insurer.   
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contributions that will be made for the policies while 
they are being run off;  
(3) an evaluation of the adequacy of the reserves that the 
insurer has posted for the book of policies and the value 
of the assets it holds to offset those reserves; and  
(4) a projection of investment returns from the assets that 
the runoff specialist plans to hold to offset the reserves 
that it will carry on its balance sheet for the 
reinsurance.108   
 
Because the original insurer has been managing the book for 
years, as have other insurers who sold similar policies covering 
similar losses in the past, the quality of the information available 
to estimate the potential losses and offsetting cash flows is 
greater than when the underlying policies were sold.  In addition, 
the passage of time means that investment returns need to be 
projected less far into the future.  This hindsight is a key part of 
what transforms the uncertainties of the past into the tradeable 
risks of today.   
With these inputs, a runoff specialist can provide a quote 
for the runoff transaction.  For the sale of a separately 
incorporated entity, the quote is simply a price for the purchase 
of that entity.  If the entity is poorly reserved, the quote may be a 
negative number:  the “dowry” of capital that the parent of the 
entity (typically a holding company in the insurance group) will 
have to put into the entity for the specialist to be willing to buy 
it.109   
 
108 See Frederick J. Pomerantz & Connie D. O’Mara, Rx for Run Off: Four Experts 
Expound, AIRROC MATTERS Summer 2015, at 6, 9 (describing important aspects of runoff 
underwriting and observing, “Basically when you look at value it’s just a time value of 
money equation. So there’s really two things that matter on the income side: premiums 
and investment income and on the liability side it’s payments and timing of those 
payments.”).  Note that when underwriting a “buy to kill” transaction, the acquirer also 
needs to assess the value of any renewal rights that it plans to sell before putting the 
company into runoff. 
109 Because of differences in the accounting rules that apply, life insurance transactions (a 
category that includes long term care and pension products) are more likely to require a 
dowry than property casualty insurance transactions. The key accounting difference 
concerns the ability to discount future payments to present value. Unlike life insurance 
accounting, property casualty insurance accounting typically does not permit such 
discounting when setting reserves for future liabilities and, thus, property casualty 
companies are less likely to be under reserved, at least on a present value basis. 
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For a reinsurance-based transaction, the quote will consist 
of two key numbers: (1) the reinsurance limit, which is the 
maximum amount that the runoff acquirer is obligated to pay out 
on the book over the course of the runoff, after which 
responsibility for managing the runoff reverts to the original 
insurer (this number can include policy management expenses or 
not, depending on the deal); and (2) the additional premium that 
the underwriter will charge, if any, on top of taking all the assets 
that presently support the liabilities that the insurer has set as 
the reserves for the book.  The higher the total limit of the 
reinsurance that the runoff underwriter offers (or the ceding 
insurer demands), the higher the premium will be (all other 
things being equal), with the premium to be still higher if the 
underwriter agrees to assume the issuing insurer’s liabilities for 
the book without limit (in which case the transaction would be 
equivalent to the reinsurance-to-close transactions used at 
Lloyds). Similarly, the more adequately reserved the underwriter 
judges the book of policies to be, the lower the premium charged 
on top of those assets will be.  A poorly reserved insurer might 
still be able to do a loss portfolio transfer without paying any 
premium beyond the transfer of the assets currently offsetting the 
reserves for the book, but the reinsurance limit would almost 
certainly be too low to provide the insurer with much confidence 
that the liabilities were gone for good.  
 
2. Policy management.  
 
The runoff underwriting process can be understood as a 
technical exercise that reflects the increasingly predictable and 
therefore tradeable nature of past uncertainties that almost 
always occurs with the simple passage of time.  This 
understanding would be too simplistic, among other reasons 
because no liabilities are tradeable until there is a buyer prepared 
to treat them as such, but it is not entirely wrong.  By contrast, it 
would be entirely wrong to understand runoff policy management 
in similarly passive terms.  Runoff policy management actively 
shapes the activities that produce the cashflows that determine 
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whether the predictions underlying runoff transactions come to 
pass.   
The day-to-day activity of running off insurance policies 
differs according to the type of insurance policies involved.  For 
liability and property insurance runoffs, policy management 
means handling and paying claims, computing and collecting any 
retrospective premiums,110 recovering any reinsurance that is 
owed, and, importantly, negotiating commutations.111  A 
“commutation” is a modification of a (re)insurance contract in 
which the (re)insurer agrees to pay the policyholder/insurer a 
sum certain in return for the policyholder/insurer agreeing that 
this sum certain satisfies all of the (re)insurer’s obligations under 
the policy.112  A commutation is a “buy back” of the policy from the 
perspective of the reinsurer and a “sell back” of the policy from 
the perspective of the insurer. 113   
Commutations are an important part of the runoff policy 
management story for two reasons. First, commutations provide 
the best evidence that runoff policy management differs from 
active policy management.  While commutations sometimes take 
place in an active insurance business, for example to resolve a 
 
110 A retrospective premium is additional premium that is paid on an ex post basis, when 
claim payments exceed negotiated amounts. 
111 Michael T. Walsh & Maryann Taylor, Commutations: A Road to Finality, AIRROC 
MATTERS, Summer 2007, at 1 (“Commutations are indeed one of the most vital tools to the 
strategic plans of run-off operations.”). 
112  For a hypothetical example of a commutation, consider the following.  Asbestos 
Manufacturer is insured by Trustworthy Insurance Company.  Trustworthy agrees to pay 
the $20 million limits of its policy to fund the defense costs and settlements of a group of 
asbestos claims against Manufacturer.   Trustworthy demands that Great Reinsurance 
Company pay $5 million of that amount, under a treaty that promised to pay 25% of 
Trustworthy’s 1985 accident year general liability losses (above a $10 million level that 
was long ago reached), subject to a reinsurance treaty limit of $50 million (of which $40 
million has been paid). Great recently was sold to a runoff specialist. Great’s new claims 
manager tells Trustworthy that it has conducted a thorough review of Great’s pre-1990 
treaties and determined that Great has been paying claims to Trustworthy and others 
that it was not legally obligated to pay. Great offers to pay $5.5 million today to commute 
the treaty, meaning that Trustworthy would be unable to collect any money under the 
treaty in the future and that Great would be unable to reopen any prior payments.    
113 See David Whear and Bob Haken, Closing books of businesss: the challenge of fairness 
and finality, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW AND 
REGULATION 167, 168-69; Stephen Carter, Bernadette Bailey, Tobey Butcher, Exit 
Strategies in the Run-Off Market, 56 FDCC QUARTERLY 219, 221 (“A commutation is in 
effect, an underwriting exercise where the reinsured is paid to take back the risk that it 
had laid off”) 
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dispute over a large commercial insurance claim,114 the 
aggressive pursuit of commutations is not part of the ordinary 
strategy of an active insurance business.  By contrast, property 
casualty runoff specialists advertise their skill and experience 
with commutations, and their U.S. trade association actively 
facilitates commutations.115   
Second, commutations can play a key role in transforming 
uncertainty into tradeable risk.  At the transaction level, a 
commutation transfers any remaining uncertainty regarding the 
losses that would have been covered by the (re)insurance contract 
back to the counterparty who accepted a payment in satisfaction 
of that contract.  At the market level, the availability of 
commutations makes runoff specialists more willing to do runoff 
deals, because they know that they can use commutations – “the 
chosen weapon of many in the legacy sector in their quest to find 
the Holy Grail of ‘finality’ to their liabilities” – to reduce the 
uncertainty involved in runoff transactions.116  
At a very high level, property casualty runoff specialists 
follow two approaches to managing the runoff after the 
acquisition: “slow” and “accelerated.”   A slow runoff manages the 
policies in much the same way that an active insurance company 
manages its obligations under old policies that remain part of the 
insurer’s active business: paying claims as they come due and 
collecting on any reinsurance for those claims on the same 
timetable, perhaps with less urgency and greater attention to 
coverage defenses than would be the case if the insurer was 
interested in selling new policies to existing customers.117  This 
 
114 For example, a senior policyholder coverage lawyer explained to me that a number of 
asbestos or environmental defendants have commuted some or all of their historical 
general liability insurance policies as a way to resolve coverage litigation with their 
insurers.   
115 See, e.g. Enstar Annual Report (commutations); AIRROC’s website articulates its 
mission and vision to include “AIRROC's VISION is to be the most valued (re)insurance 
industry educator and network provider for issue resolution and creation of optimal exit 
strategies.”  https://www.airroc.org/mission-statement.  
116 See Julius Bannister, Bygone Companies, AIRROC MATTERS, Summer 2015 15-16 
(providing a summary of “a major listing of commutations, the chosen weapon of many in 
the legacy sector in their quest to find the Holy Grail of ‘finality’ to their liabilities.”) 
117 See, AIRROC Roundtable Discussion – March 5, 2008, AIRROC MATTERS Spring 2008 
at 19 (“In other situations the goal of the runoff operation is to delay the payment of 
claims”). I describe below the critique that slow runoffs are much slower than ordinary.  
Cf., JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND:  WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY 
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kind of runoff is slow because it takes a long time for all the 
obligations under the policies to mature and be satisfied in the 
ordinary course.  
An accelerated runoff speeds up the process by reaching 
out to the original insurer’s counter parties and offering to 
commute their legacy insurance policies and reinsurance 
contracts.118  Because commutations are voluntary on both ends, 
negotiating commutations is a core expertise of an accelerated 
runoff specialist. 119  Accelerated runoffs are most common when 
running off an inactive reinsurance company, because the 
counterparties are insurance companies.  Reinsurance contracts 
tend to involve enough money to make the commutation process 
worth doing, and insurance companies have become increasingly 
comfortable with commuting their reinsurance.  While the 
commutation indisputably shifts some risk back to the insurer, 
that risk is just more of the same risk that the insurer already 
faces, and, thus, already has on its balance sheet. Often, the 
runoff specialist can offer reinsurance commutation terms that 
improve the balance sheets of the insurance company 
counterparties.120  The exception is when the reinsurer being run 
off is in weak financial condition. In that circumstance, however, 
insurance company counterparties should be even more willing to 
commute their reinsurance contracts, because of the risk that 
they will later recover even less if the reinsurer becomes more 
financially impaired.  As the latter point suggests, runoff 
 
CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010) (suggesting that difficulties in the claims 
process are not unique to the runoff market). 
118 See AIRROC Roundtable Discussion, supra note xx at 19 (“there are many run-off 
entities that are looking for a resolution of all their claims in a short period of time”). 
119 See Terry Kelaher, Claim Estimation, AIRROC MATTERS, Fall 2005, at 16 (contrasting 
the voluntary nature of commutation from “forced, non-contractual estimation and 
payment acceleration”).  For a time, as discussed infra, the UK permitted the involuntary, 
wholesale commutation of policies and reinsurance contracts through a process that was 
known as a “solvent scheme of arrangement.”  That process has for all practical purposes 
been shut down by the British courts and the Prudential Regulatory Authority [document 
in folder]. See In re British Aviation Insurance Company [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch).   
120 See Charles J. Widder, Commutation of Reinsurance Agreements, AIRROC MATTERS, 
Summer 2007 at 10 (“The ceding insurer may in fact have concluded that the reinsurance 
provided is no longer necessary and prefers to assume the liabilities back from the 
reinsurer along with a cash payment”). 
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specialists are adept at turning financial weakness into a 
negotiating strength.121 
The greater importance of commutations in reinsurance 
runoff points to another important difference between the runoff 
of insurance and reinsurance liabilities.  Because reinsurers’ 
counterparties are insurance companies, any haircuts, delays, 
compromises or other variations from “normal” reinsurance 
market practice that are part of runoff have the effect of 
socializing losses among the insurance industry, similar in some 
ways to how Equitas socialized losses among the Names of the 
open syndicates.  Especially because runoff market transactions 
frequently involve loss categories that the entire market 
underestimated,122 reinsurance runoff can be understood as a 
process for sharing uncertainty across the broader insurance pool, 
based on the relative exposure of (re)insurers to the liabilities 
being run off.  This process may not be as explicit or predictable 
as the market-share based assessments that fund the insurance 
guaranty funds that step in to pay claims when insurers become 
insolvent, but it is similar in kind.   
Retail insurance runoff is very different in this regard.  
Any haircuts, delays, compromises or other variations from 
“normal” retail market practice that are part of runoff have the 
effect of de-socializing losses, by leaving a greater share of those 
losses with the people or organizations that purchased the 
insurance.  This difference helps explain the much greater 
regulatory scrutiny given to the runoff of retail insurance 
operations than to reinsurance.123 
 
121 Susanne Sclafane, Adverse Development Covers on the Rise, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, 
PROPERTY & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MANAGEMENT EDITION, July 24, 2000 at S11:  
“Not only does an insurer need a great deal of manpower and runoff expertise to 
take ownership, but ‘you need to be structured in a way that you don’t mind 
squeezing cedent clients,’ he [PSRE’s Mr. Mayer] said.  Profitably running off 
claims might mean offering 20 cents on the dollar he said, suggesting that for a 
reinsurer to make runoff operations successful it needs to separate its ‘bad cop’ 
runoff experts from the remaining ‘good cops.’” 
122 For example, APH liabilities, construction defect litigation liabilities, workers 
compensation liabilities, and guaranteed minimum value life insurance policy liabilities. 
123 Interview (May 5, 2019). 
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The life insurance runoff market grew somewhat later and 
in response to different developments than property casualty 
runoff.  In life insurance, the problems that lead to runoff are 
more likely to come from the asset side of the balance sheet: 
returns on investments that turn out to be much lower than 
expected.124  Life insurance industry runoffs typically involve 
savings-linked insurance products that were priced based on 
overly optimistic assumptions about interest rates, which would 
of course affect what the company would be able to earn from the 
assets under investment: whole life insurance, annuities, pension 
guarantees, and long term care insurance.  Among these, long 
term care insurance runoffs are unique in that they involve not 
only unrealistic assumptions about earnings from assets, but also 
problems on the liability side of the balance sheet: changes in the 
costs of, and demand for, long term care.125  
For all these life insurance product runoffs, policy 
management includes collecting premiums and contributions 
from policyholders whose policies remain in force, communicating 
with those policyholders, and related customer service activities, 
in addition to collecting reinsurance and handling and paying 
claims.  Thus, life insurance runoff also differs from property 
casualty runoff in the nature of the ongoing relationship between 
the insurance company and its policyholders. 126 In a property 
 
124 See, e.g. Leslie Scism, Hartford to sell “run off” life insurance business, Market Watch 
(Dec. 4, 2017). https://www.marketwatch.com/story/hartford-to-sell-run-off-life-insurance-
business-2017-12-04 
125 See, e.g. Jalayne J. Arias, The Last Hope: How Starting Over Could Save Private Long 
Term Care Insurance, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 127 (2019). 
126 Swiss Re described its life runoff business in a 2018 prospectus as follows: 
We acquire portfolios through acquisition of entire lines of business (and a 
subsequent transfer of the business to us in the United Kingdom under Part VII 
of FSMA or the entire share capital of (or a majority stake in) life insurance 
companies, or through reinsurance. We typically assume responsibility for 
administering the underlying policies in such portfolios until they reach 
maturity, are surrendered or an insured event occurs resulting in the 
termination of the policies. In addition, we write a nominal amount of new 
business on a passive basis normally for existing customers that request "top-
ups" of current contracts or who need to move to an alternative product type to 
access certain product features. Our strategy is centered around gross cash 
generation (excess capital available compared with the target capital position) 
and we seek to maximize our future expected profits through a combination of 
efficient management of existing policies, disciplined asset management, the 
acquisition of additional books of business and consolidation of new business 
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casualty insurance runoff, there are no premiums to be collected 
or policies to be renewed; the only ongoing relationship revolves 
around claims.  The ongoing relationship in the life insurance 
segment makes it difficult to commute policies.127 Thus, life 
insurance runoff investors tend to be companies that have a long-
term asset management focus.128 
As even this very general description makes plain, runoff 
policy management details differ greatly across insurance market 
segments, with each segment posing a different set of 
uncertainties to manage.  Asbestos liabilities are similar in many, 
but not all, ways to environmental liabilities; both kinds of toxic 
tort liabilities differ significantly from medical malpractice, 
workers compensation, and municipal liabilities; these liabilities 
differ from sexual abuse and molestation claims; and natural 
catastrophe and mega property insurance claims differ 
significantly from liability insurance claims. On the life and 
health insurance side of the insurance business, life insurance 
presents policy management challenges that are similar to, but 
 
with existing operations to benefit from capital and asset management, 
operational and incidental tax synergies.  
Swiss Re Global Share Participation Plan 2018, 67, 
https://www.swissre.com/dam/jcr:51c80e34-c8ab-46c2-b69c-
6cd8c1ef9dcd/Swiss_Re_GSPP_Prospectus.pdf 
127 There are two kinds of life transactions that have a similar impact as a commutation: 
(1) companies managing an annuity runoff sometimes offer policyholders an “enhanced 
annuitization” option, that amounts to a buyout of the annuity (interview May 15, 2019) 
and (2) when companies managing a long term care runoff receive regulatory approval to 
increase rates for in force policies, they typically offer policyholders the option of selecting 
a shorter benefit period, which has the effect of reducing the right tail risk of the company 
(Interview May 5, 2019). An improper practice that would significantly limit the right tail 
risk of the runoff operation is inducing policyholders to lapse.  See Jean Pinquet, 
Montserrat Guillen & Merceded Ayuso, Commitment and Lapse Behavior in Long-Term 
Insurance: A Case Study, 78 J. RISK AND INS. 983, 986-7 (2011) (describing the benefit to 
the insurer from policyholder lapses when insurance pricing is front-loaded, as is the case 
in long term care and some forms of life insurance).  Cf., Andrew Harley and Ian Farr, 
How Can Life Insurers Improve the Performance of Their In-force Portfolios? WILLIS 
TOWERS WATSTON INSIGHTS, September 2013, https://www.towerswatson.com/en-
US/Insights/Newsletters/Global/emphasis/2013/how-can-life-insurers-improve-the-
performance-of-their-in-force-portfolios (recommending that insurers “establish 
mechanisms to focus their retention management activities on higher-value customers” as 
an example of “smart customer handling — relates to treating customers differently 
depending on the underlying financial attractiveness of their policy to the insurer”) 
128 See, e.g., RESOLUTION LIFE, OUR PURPOSE, https://resolutionlife.com/our-purpose/ (last 
visited June 5, 2019) (“Returning capital over time to our institutional investors in the 
form of a steady dividend yield”); Oliver Ralph, Europe’s Life Insurers Fall into the Hands 
of Private Equity, FIN. TIMES (OCT. 22, 2018), HTTPS://WWW.FT.COM/CONTENT/4E89FF8E-
C8AF-11E8-BA8F-EE390057B8C9 . 
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significantly different from, annuities and pensions; and long-
term care insurance presents its own distinct set of challenges.   
Because of these differences among insurance market 
segments, the details of insurance runoff policy management 
resist easy generalization. The common thread that runs 
throughout runoff policy management is that intensive exposure 
to the legacy liabilities of each particular market segment leads 
to expertise and relationships that have the potential to reduce 
the costs of running off those liabilities.129  Through this exposure, 
the runoff specialists identify market-segment-specific 
opportunities to contain and manage the legacy liabilities. Here 
are two examples. 
Addressing the coverage litigation collective action problem 
and reducing legal spend in liability insurance runoff.  For 
technical reasons that are not important to understand in this 
context, any single significant asbestos liability defendant or 
hazardous waste site defendant may have dozens or even 
hundreds of individual liability insurance policies that provide 
coverage for all or part of its potential liabilities, issued by 
multiple insurance companies, over multiple decades.130  In this 
circumstance, a well-counseled commercial policyholder can take 
advantage of what amounts to a collective action problem among 
its many insurance companies.  The consolidation of most of the 
 
129 See, e.g., Pomerantz & O’Mara, supra note xx at 7 (noting that one important aspect of 
runoff management is making accurate assumptions about reinsurance collectibles, which 
requires detailed knowledge about the current state of the market and observing that “if 
the company is going into runoff, it could change the assuming reinsurers’ view on the way 
that they are paying out because they’ve no longer got an ongoing relationship with that 
client.”); Charles Ehrlich, Found Money or Unobtaimium: Security Deposits and the Run-
off Company, AIRROC MATTERS, Winter 2006/2007, at 21 (describing ways to recover 
security postings, which can be an important source of capital).  “People in the runoff side 
now could go back into the ongoing side and I think it will help control costs because people 
in the runoff side are always focusing on keeping costs low.”  AIRROC, Thoughts on the 
Future, Vimeo (2017), https://vimeo.com/232113382. Connie D. O’Mara & Bina Dagar, 
Marcus Doran: Marcus Opens Up About the Biz, Likes and Dislikes, and AIRROC, 
AIRROC MATTERS, Fall 2014, at 24 (“In respect to the run-off market, I’ve learned that it 
is a relationship business. The issues are complex, and there is a great deal of history 
between trading partners.  Therefore, it is imperative to establish relationships based on 
respect, trust, and integrity.”); Pomerantz & O’Mara, supra note XX [Rx for Run Off] at 8 
(observing that different (re)insurers have different “appetite for commutation”; knowing 
that appetite allows you to better assess a potential runoff).  An early special issue of 
AIRROC Matters devoted to commutations reveals some of the nuances and relationships 
of commutations. See generally, AIRROC MATTERS: SPECIAL EDITION – COMMUTATIONS, 
Summer 2007. 
130 See Stempel, supra note XX 
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asbestos and environmental runoff liabilities of some of the 
largest insurers into the hands of a very small number of runoff 
specialists has changed this negotiating dynamic and, because 
the insurers for whom the specialists are managing the runoff no 
longer each need their own lawyer for all purposes, reduced 
insurers’ insurance coverage litigation costs.  That consolidation 
may also have the potential to address a similar collective action 
problem that results when the underlying plaintiffs sue many 
defendants. 
Rationalizing legacy information technology in life 
insurance runoff.  Insurance companies are intensive users of 
information technology.  The earliest “computers” were humans, 
many of whom worked for insurance companies, and the 
insurance industry has long been an important customer of 
information technology manufacturers.131 For the life insurance 
industry especially, the rapid change of information technology 
presents a challenge to the consistent, reliable maintenance of 
processes and customer relationships under contracts that can 
last decades.132  Each new life insurance product and each new 
feature in an existing life insurance product requires adjustments 
in information processing routines.  Major updates in the core 
information technology of the life insurance company can require 
adjustments in hundreds, if not thousands, of policy management 
routines.133  In many cases it makes more sense, especially in the 
short run, to keep those routines running on older systems.  Not 
surprisingly, life insurance companies are full of legacy 
information technologies running processes for legacy insurance 
products.134  A key selling point of life insurance runoff specialists 
is relief from the cost and headache of maintaining legacy 
information technology systems for an unprofitable and declining 
book of legacy policies.135  Life insurance runoff specialists have 
 
131 JOANN YATES, STRUCTURING THE INFORMATION AGE: LIFE INSURANCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2005). 
132 Matthias Daub & Ferruciio Lagutaine, The Value in Outsourcing Legacy Insurance 
Products, McKinsey & Company Operations (December 2010). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 See, e.g. Wilton Re, In Force Solutions (“Our Administrative Services solutions provide 
for operational efficiencies by reliably transferring insurance and annuity business to 
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become expert in converting multiple legacy life insurance books 
running on multiple legacy information systems to a common, 
more state-of-the-art information system,136 which is a concrete 
example of how the consolidation of insurance runoff reduces the 
marginal cost of managing the policies in runoff. 
 
3. Runoff finance and asset management.  
 
The finance and asset management functions of insurance 
runoff specialists differ from those of active insurers in ways that 
reflect the narrower focus of runoff operations and, like the policy 
management examples just described, support the claim that 
consolidation leads to more efficient runoff operations.  Runoff 
finance is simpler than active insurance company finance because 
runoff companies have more focused operations and, hence, fewer 
expenses to project (and hold capital against): no salesforce, little 
to no marketing, few underwriters, and little brick and mortar.137  
A property casualty runoff company is, essentially, an insurance 
mergers and acquisition fund with a claims management 
department.138 A life insurance runoff company needs to add a 
policyholder management function, but that function is highly 
automated, as explained in the life insurance policy management 
example above. Apart from these two management functions, a 
runoff company has more in common with acquisition vehicles, 
such as private equity funds, than an active insurance company.  
 
updated technology in a secure operating environment”). https://www.wiltonre.com/in-
force/ 
136 Swiss Re, Life in-force management: improving customer value and long term 
profitability, SIGMA 6/2017 at 35 (recommending “brining all operations onto a single 
modern IT platform) 
137 Interview (January 31, 2019). 
138 Id.   I once happened to be sitting on a train next to a senior lawyer who worked at a 
runoff company.  It was obvious to me that this person was a lawyer, so we started chatting 
about law practice.  When I asked what the lawyer did, the lawyer replied, “I’m an M&A 
lawyer,” figuring that there was no way that I would have heard of insurance runoff and 
that this more general title best described the role of a lawyer working at a runoff 
specialist. 
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Perhaps for that reason, private equity funds hold substantial 
stakes in runoff companies.139 
Companies that specialize in runoff also invest their assets 
differently than active insurance companies.  Among those 
companies for which it is possible to obtain asset information, the 
runoff companies invest in higher risk securities that, on average, 
yield a higher return than the investments of a comparison set of 
generalist property casualty companies, and a much larger share 
of the assets are invested in illiquid alternative assets.140 My 
understanding from interviews is that this is true to an even 
greater extent for privately held runoff companies.141 My working 
hypothesis is that runoff specialists take greater risk on the asset 
side of the balance sheet than most insurance companies for four 
main reasons (recognizing that not all of these reasons apply 
equally well to all the runoff specialists).  First, as reinsurance 
companies, they are less heavily regulated than insurance 
companies.  Second, because they are already so deeply into the 
business of compromising their liabilities, the downside of taking 
risk on the asset side of their balance sheets does not threaten 
their business model, for example because running into trouble 
on the asset side of their balance sheet simply increases their 
“financial distress” leverage with counterparties.  Third, the 
people who provide capital to the runoff specialists regard those 
specialists as high risk/high reward investments, and they are 
comfortable with the specialists taking risk on both sides of the 
balance sheets.  Finally, to the extent that the runoff specialist is 
backed by private equity, the private equity owners may get an 
allocation of the assets to manage in their own funds, which will 
be recorded as (high risk) illiquid alternative assets on the runoff 
specialist’s balance sheet.142 
 
139 See, e.g., Catalina, Wilton Re, Athene, others 
140 See Appendix A.   
141 Cf. Divya Kirti and Natasha Sarin, Private Equity Investments in the Life Insurance 
Industry: Implications for Capital, Taxes, and Risk (working paper 2020) (analyzing 
investment portfolios of life insurers acquired by Athene, a subsidiary of Apollo Global 
Management).  Apollo is one of the largest investors in Catalina, which is privately held. 
142 Email from runoff market participant, June 24, 2019 (regarding PE asset allocation). 
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B. Rhetoric and Organizational Structure:  The 
Runoff Stories 
 
“We aren’t the glamour kids….  We are the 
ghosts of mistakes past, of the failures that 
had fathers when they were shiny new 
ideas but are now orphaned in dismal 
disappointment.  No one ever says, ‘this 
book/program is a great success, let’s put it 
in run-off.’  So, by definition, we deal in 
failure.”143 
 
As just described, runoff underwriting reprices legacy 
liabilities with the benefit of hindsight; runoff policy management 
consolidates those liabilities, develops relevant expertise, and 
identifies and executes operational efficiencies; runoff asset 
management takes calculated risks that encourage additional 
providers of capital to enter the runoff market; and runoff finance 
facilitates lower cost planning for the process of the runoff. Runoff 
specialists undoubtedly do not execute any of these activities with 
perfection, but they have a decent claim to better execution than 
is possible inside an active insurance company, for which the 
liabilities in runoff are a dwindling and unpleasant reminder of 
the underwriting mistakes of the past.144   
Insurance runoff also operates through a rhetorical and 
organizational process that begins long before the runoff market 
transaction takes place.  This process reconceptualizes a large, 
diverse number of individual insurance relationships into 
segregable books of legacy insurance liabilities that can be 
managed distinctly from those of the insurer’s active business.   
This reconceptualization happens slowly.  As the time 
when the insurer sold the policies recedes into the past, insurance 
company personnel increasingly understand and categorize the 
 
143 Charles Ehrlich, Why Are We Here?, AIRROC MATTERS, Summer 2015 at 20 
144 To be clear, not all runoff transactions can fairly be characterized as “the ghosts of 
mistakes past” referred to in the quote above.  While that characterization is fair for the 
APH transactions like Lloyd’s reconstruction and renewal, runoff market participants 
emphasize that some, more recent transactions simply reflect trades between insurers 
that wish to release the capital that they would otherwise have to hold against long term 
risks with runoff specialists that are looking to increase the assets that they manage.  See, 
e.g. June 24, 2019 email. 
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policies in terms of the claims presented and the liabilities carried 
on the company’s financial statements, as opposed to the 
identities, activities, or other distinguishing features of 
individual policyholders that company underwriters considered 
during the sales process. Company actuaries track the financial 
results of the policies using statistics like the underwriting ratio, 
which compares the premiums collected for blocks of policies to 
the losses incurred under those blocks of policies.145  Gradually, 
the actuaries develop and propagate the understanding that a 
particular block of policies – understood as an aggregate – was a 
losing proposition for the company, and, therefore, that this group 
of policyholders got more than they paid for.146 
At some point in this process, company underwriters 
decide not to sell new policies into this market (or not to cover 
these kinds of risks on an ongoing basis), confirming what the 
people involved in managing the claims and reserves already 
knew: this book of policies is non-core, unwanted business that 
does not represent the future of the company.147  Indeed, this book 
of policies might even be a threat to the financial health of the 
company, making work on the book perilous to the careers of the 
people in the company who are responsible in the ordinary course 
for managing claims and setting reserves.148  Identifying the book 
 
145 For an explanation of the underwriting ratio, see Chairman’s Letter, supra note xx 
(explaining why he prefers a measure that takes the investment income into account).   
146 See, e.g., John West, Managing the Past in the Future, AIRROC MATTERS, Fall 2013 at 
12,13 (describing a typical runoff situation as follows: “There is no premium flow to offset 
the cost of those staff members.  The loss ratio on the original business has long since 
exceeded 200%. Of the $20 milllion in outstanding reserves, investment income is 
currently generating about 3.5% per year.  That equates to $700,000.  Those 10 staff 
members and their associated costs could total $1.4 million per year.  Just on the face of 
it, there is a huge disparity between the income and the outgo on this aged business!”).  
See note xx, supra (on the alternative framing of the “more than they paid for” aspect of 
runoff stories). 
147 For a stylized parable of how this can happen, see Fitzpatrick, supra note xx at 270-73. 
148 Luann M. Petrellis, Can U.S. Insurance Companies Afford Not to Restructure?, AIRROC 
MATTERS, Winter 2016-17 at 6 (“The pressure is now on all insurance carriers to manage 
their capital more efficiently.”  Eleni Iacovides, The Legacy Market, AIRROC MATTERS, 
Spring 2017 at 15: 
Solvency II, the relatively new European regulatory framework, along with low 
investment returns, soft market and pressure on underwriting profit has forced 
insurers to focus, more than ever, on the cost of capital and consequently on 
capital efficiency, in addition to the need for optimization of internal resources 
and cost reduction.  Reserves held for old, discontinued or non-core business 
have become more capital intensive, thereby restricting insurers’ ability to 
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as being “in runoff,” and shifting the management of that book to 
runoff specialists mitigates that career risk.149  The rhetoric and 
organizational logic of runoff normalizes that process: 
 
Runoff is an organic, positive necessary part of a 
healthy (re)insurance industry. … Businesses need 
to test new markets and products; often, the 
outcome is “run-off.” Ultimately, most 
relationships end.  What happens?  Run-off.  
Customer requirements and demands change.  
Results?  Run-off.  Specialists and dedicated 
professionals are needed to deal with the most 
volatile – and therefore the most important – of the 
insurance industry’s protections against 
catastrophe.150 
 
This transition to runoff is an extension of the process that 
routinely occurs in the insurance business, as policyholders 
transition from the sales side of the insurance relationship to the 
claims side of that relationship. As prior work has shown, 
insurers tell different sets of stories about insurance when 
communicating with policyholders during the sales and claims 
processes: 
 
In the first set of stories – the sales stories – 
insurance companies promise complete protection 
from the risks addressed by any line of insurance.  
In the second set of stories – the claims stories – 
insurance companies explain why it is that 
“complete protection” sometimes amounts to a little 
less; why it is, in other words, that some risks are 
not shifted to the insurance company.151   
 
deploy capital elsewhere such as new products, digitalization or a strategy to 
increase one’s market share in core business or a new jurisdiction. 
Eleni Iacovides, The Legacy Market, AIRROC MATTERS, Fall 2017 at 20: 
The continued lack of investment returns, the need to ring-fence exposure, the 
more stringent regulatory obligations coupled with the additional capital 
required to simply operate and write the same level of business; each continues 
to drive the search for ways with which to limit an insurer’s exposure to the 
unknown or uncertain and to deliver value to shareholders. 
149 See Fitzpatrick, supra note –. 
150 Andrew Maneval, Why We Work in “Run-Off,” AIRROC MATTERS, Fall 2014 at 9, 10. 
151 See Baker, Sales Stories, Claims Stories, supra note xx at 1400  
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The sales stories highlight policyholders’ vulnerability and 
dependence, and they convey the message that insurers can be 
trusted to fulfill their promise to be there in time of need.152 By 
contrast, the claims stories stress the limits of the insurance 
contract, the insurance company’s responsibility to future 
claimants, and the need to protect the insurance pool from 
policyholders who take unfair advantage.153 Insurers reduce the 
opportunity for these two sets of stories to come directly into 
conflict “by separating the organizational responsibility for the 
narration of the two sets of stories.”154  The sales and marketing 
departments tell the sales stories; the claims department tells the 
claims stories.  The sales stories help persuade people to buy 
insurance.  The claims stories help people accept that there are 
limits on the protection that insurance provides. 
The transition to runoff involves a third set of stories, told 
by people with yet another organizational responsibility: the 
runoff professionals.  These runoff stories refer to “legacy 
liabilities” that represent a “drag” on insurance performance and 
that “trap capital” that could otherwise be put to better use.155  
Unlike the individualized promises of the sales stories and the 
contractual obligations of the claims stories, legacy liabilities are 
actuarial representations of contingent future payments to an 
abstract collectivity.  Unlike these promises and obligations, 
legacy liabilities can be accelerated and compromised, and, 
perhaps, delayed and denied. Compromising and accelerating 
those liabilities can be a fair thing to do, at least for large 
commercial policyholders and for reinsurance cedents (insurance 
companies that bought reinsurance), because, with the benefit of 
hindsight, it is clear that the policyholders/cedents who bought 
 
152 Id. at 1403-07. 
153 Id. at 1407-13. 
154 Id. at 1415-16. 
155 See, e.g., RESOLUTION LIFE, OUR PURPOSE, https://resolutionlife.com/our-purpose/ (last 
visited 3/15/2019) (“We help global insurance groups to pursue growth and innovate new 
products by allowing them to release capital and remove cost stranded in their legacy 
insurance portfolios.”).  
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that (re)insurance got far more than they paid for.156 While each 
individual policyholder or cedent retains the contractual right to 
insist on the payment of its claims as they become due, the runoff 
administrators also have the right to revisit the prior process for 
paying claims on this legacy book of business to search for 
previously unrecognized or unasserted coverage defenses and for 
other ways to “manage expenses,” encouraging 
policyholders/cedents to recognize that compromise should be the 
normal, accepted practice in the runoff context for them as well.157   
The runoff stories posit several benefits that the runoff 
market provides to the broader insurance market.  Runoff 
transactions unlock value by transferring legacy books of 
insurance policies to companies that value those books more 
highly, providing access to capital that the originating insurers 
can use to expand their core, active insurance business, “freeing 
them up to do the business that they want to do,” thereby 
increasing the availability of (re)insurance. 158  Because runoff 
specialists administer legacy (re)insurance policies more 
efficiently, the runoff market lowers the cost, and hence the price, 
of insurance.159  Finally, the runoff market allows insurance 
groups to unwind their struggling subsidiaries outside of the 
cumbersome and expensive insurance insolvency process, 
reducing the drain that insurance guarantees impose on the 
active insurance market.160 
There are a number of obvious countervailing concerns 
that can and should inform an evaluation of the merits of any 
particular runoff transaction and the runoff market’s 
 
156 See note xx (on alternative framing).  Note that the runoff trade literature and the 
runoff market participants that I interviewed exclusively employ this reasoning in relation 
to cedents and large commercial policyholders, not retail insurance customers. 
157 E.g. Interview (May 7, 2019)  
158 Interview with runoff market participant (May 6, 2019).  
159 Eleni Iacovides, The Legacy Market, AIRROC MATTERS, Spring 2017 at 17: 
[Runoff transactions] release capital, allow the [original insurer] to achieve 
higher ROE by investing released capital in more profitable and/or core 
business, reduce the insurer’s exposure to potentially long-tail and volatile 
business and reduce operational overheads. Employing these solutions also often 
receives support from the [original insurer’s] regulator as regulators are now 
more than ever, keen to support any steps taken by insurers which are likely to 
avoid failure. 
160 See, e.g., Id.   
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contribution to social welfare more generally. I describe those 
concerns, so as not to leave the misimpression that I am unaware 
of them or that I have uncritically accepted the view of the world 
that the runoff stories reflect, but the evaluation of the social 
welfare of runoff lies outside the scope of this Article.  Such an 
evaluation would require different methods than those I have 
employed here.  
The most obvious countervailing concerns include the 
following.  Runoff transactions could be used to move legacy 
obligations into, or leave those obligations in, entities without 
sufficient assets to support them.161 Even if the runoff entities are 
sufficiently capitalized, the runoff specialists may not have the 
same incentive as the originating (re)insurers to fulfill the 
underlying contractual obligations.162 Even if they do have, or can 
be made to have, the same incentives and capacity as the 
originating (re)insurers, those incentives do not necessarily favor 
policyholders and cedants, and the runoff specialists’ expertise in 
commutations and other ways of managing expenses may mean 
that policyholders and cedants take larger haircuts from runoff 
specialists than they would from (re)insurers running off their 
own risks.163  Moreover, even if most runoff specialists would like 
to pay claims responsibly, the existence of a few that are willing 
to flout customary insurance market norms places pressure on 
 
161  This is the insurance instantiation of the dynamic Lynn LoPucki described over twenty 
years ago. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE. L.J. 54 (1996).  The way to 
use a runoff transaction to leave legacy obligations in an underfunded entity is to enter 
into a transaction that transfers the “good” business and the assets that support it into a 
newly formed entity, while leaving the “bad” business in the originating entity.  The 
administrative law challenge to the New York Department of Financial Service’s approval 
of the restructuring of MBIA during the Financial Crisis alleged that was the intended 
purpose of the restructuring.  See [cite to appropriate court decision.] 
162 See, e.g., John M. Sylvester and Max Louik, Policyholder Litigation Challenging the 
Claims-Handling Conduct of Resolute Management, 28 ENV. CLAIMS J. 97, 98 (2016) 
(“Once Resolute takes control of claims handling for the ceding insurer, Resolute has been 
known to pursue very aggressive strategies to reduce and delay the payout of coverage 
dollars to policyholders, the payment of attorneys fees to defense counsel, and the offering 
and payment of settlement amounts to underlying claimants”) (note that Mr. Sylvester 
was at the time of this writing actively engaged in litigation against Resolute). 
163 According to market participants I interviewed, this is a widely shared belief among 
insurance company personnel responsible for collecting reinsurance.  Whether this is a 
selection effect or a causal explanation is not knowable absent the kind of well-designed 
empirical research that is highly unlikely ever to be done.  
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the others to do likewise.164  Finally, dividing or unwinding 
troubled (re)insurers outside of the insolvency process shifts risks 
to policyholders from shareholders, who are supposed to be the 
first to come up short when assets are insufficient to cover 
liabilities.165 
Runoff boosters have answers to these concerns that I 
report here, once again without assessing their merits. Above all, 
the boosters point to contract law and insurance regulation. When 
a runoff transaction involves reinsurance, the originating 
insurers remain legally responsible for their policies, and, thus, 
the transaction should not affect the amount of assets available 
to honor the liabilities or the incentives of the originating 
insurer.166 When the transaction involves the sale of an entire 
entity that is in runoff, the transaction cannot take place unless 
the insurance regulator in the state of domicile approves, and 
regulators are not supposed to approve runoff transactions that 
put or leave insurance liabilities in entities without sufficient 
assets.167 Because runoff specialists need a constant supply of new 
transactions, they need to treat policyholders and cedants fairly 
on their old deals or they won’t get new reinsurance deals, and 
regulators won’t approve new acquisition deals.168 The focus and 
expertise of the runoff companies helps policyholders more than 
it hurts them, particularly in the later stages of the runoff, when 
the originating insurer would have lost or redeployed the most 
competent claims handlers.169  Finally, insolvency is a long, 
 
164 One industry insider described the claims payment strategy of a certain runoff 
specialist as “Don’t answer the phone or, even better, don’t have a phone.” Interview (April 
7, 2019). 
165 See, e.g., Steven E. Sigalow and Richard E. Stewart, How Lloyd’s Saved Itself, 37 THE 
INSURANCE FORUM XX (February 2010) (contrasting the situation of troubled banks, 
whose shareholders “have been severely penalized or wiped out entirely,” with the 
treatment of Lloyd’s names, who were insulated from pre-1993 losses by Equitas). 
166 Of course, if the transaction releases capital to the counterparty that is then paid out 
or used to fund ventures that don’t work, then there are fewer assets. 
167 Eleni Iacovides, The Legacy Market, AIRROC MATTERS/Winter 2017-18 at 11 
168 Id. acovides, 11 (observing that a runoff acquirer is “keen to preserve its own reputation 
in order to gain more business from the same client, new clients, to grow”).  One market 
participant described his company as follows: “[Company] is like a shark in the water. We 
have to get water over our gills via continually acquiring new portfolios.”  Email (January 
30, 2019). 
169 Iacovides, supra note xx 
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drawn-out, inefficient and expensive process (think Bleak House) 
that returns less to most policyholders than a private runoff, and 
policyholders who would receive more in receivership can always 
hold out for that result.170   
 
IV. Conclusion:  Lessons for Legal Thought 
 
The rise of the runoff market has expanded insurers’ 
options for managing their legacy liabilities. Whether that 
development benefits policyholders and (re)insurance companies 
equally is an important question, but one that requires different 
research methods to answer with certainty than the qualitative 
methods I report in this Article.  My conclusion is that the benefits 
to the insurance market are real, especially when it comes to the 
runoff of reinsurance treaty obligations, but there also are real 
countervailing concerns, especially for consumer and small to 
medium enterprise policyholders.  
The kind of empirical research needed to provide 
conclusive evidence regarding the social welfare benefits of the 
runoff market has not been done, and most likely never will be 
done, among other reasons because of the limits of publicly 
available data.  In my view, the benefits outweigh the costs for 
reinsurance treaty runoff; the benefits outweigh the costs for 
large commercial policy runoff, as long as there remains a 
meaningful bad faith remedy to encourage responsible claim 
payment practices; and there is a case to be made that the 
benefits outweigh the costs even for consumer and small business 
market runoff, provided that regulators remain vigilant and there 
are private enforcement tools sufficient to motivate high quality 
lawyers to bring actions that discourage bad apples. That is, 
however, just my view.  The outcome of a careful weighing of the 
pros and cons of the insurance runoff market remains uncertain.   
All that is certain, and all that this Article aspires to use 
the runoff market to demonstrate to legal theory, are the 
following three points.  First, insurers are more actively involved 
 
170 Interview (May 7, 2019). 
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in managing uncertainty than the ideal type of the fixed-in-
advance distribution of determinable risks would suggest.  
Second, insurance markets have the capacity to innovate in 
response to shocks:  shocks from legal change, such as the 
asbestos and environmental liability experience that started the 
rise of runoff; shocks on the asset side of the balance sheet, such 
as the prolonged, extreme decline in interest rates that led to the 
rise of runoff in the life and pension business; and shocks from 
major changes in end of life care that, along with the decline in 
interest rates, may lead to a rise in the long term care runoff 
market, recognizing that careful analysis of long term care runoff 
awaits future work.  Third, as a result of insurers’ experience 
managing uncertainty and insurance markets’ capacity to 
innovate, those markets are far more resilient in the face of legal 
change and other sources of uncertainty than the prevailing ideal 
type would suggest. 
 While no single qualitative study can prove that the 
prevailing insurance ideal type – the fixed-in-advance 
distribution of determinable risks – fails to capture the real-life 
operation of the insurance business, even one such study can 
demonstrate that insurance operates outside this ideal type.  The 
accumulating weight of studies, to which the research on runoff 
reported in this Article contributes, suggests that the insurance 
industry so regularly operates in the realm of uncertainty that 
this ideal type should be abandoned as a model of how insurance 
generally works, even if it might continue to have some validity 
in some sectors of the insurance market and significant value in 
theoretical work. 
In that regard, as I emphasized at the outset, it is 
important not to exoticize the insurance runoff transactions 
explored in this Article. The rise of runoff did not create insurers’ 
need or capacity to manage uncertainty.  It simply helps bring 
that need into clearer view and provides another demonstration 
of that capacity.  As early insurance accountants understood, 
every insurance policy goes into a kind of runoff the moment it is 
sold. The promises made in all insurance policies get bundled and 
reconceptualized into sets of liabilities that are valued and 
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revalued, further combined and recombined over time.  Some sets 
of liabilities perform better than expected; others worse.  Insurers 
use profits earned on the better performing sets to offset losses on 
the worse performing sets, and if too many sets perform too badly, 
insurers must raise prices on their new policies.  Insurers back 
the promises and contractual obligations featured in their sales 
and claims stories with large, general accounts precisely so that 
they can make these kinds of adjustments across sets of liabilities 
and assets over time.  Cross subsidies abound.  
These post-underwriting adjustments take place not just 
for the long-term, legacy insurance obligations traded in the 
runoff insurance market. Even short-term insurance obligations 
like private passenger auto and homeowners policies face 
significant uncertainties, from factors such as changes in 
underwriting and risk classification technologies, new entries 
into the insurance market (think insuretech today), changes in 
legal rules regarding residual markets, changes in the mix or risk 
appetite of reinsurers in a market, changes in auto and home 
construction technology, and, of course, changes in the legal rules 
regarding liability or insurance.171 The runoff market targets 
longer term obligations, not because they are uniquely uncertain, 
but rather because their longer duration provides greater 
opportunities for specialists to earn a return through financial 
engineering or liability management.   
 Industry leaders understand that a precise match 
between the price charged for one set of insurance policies and 
the losses incurred in that set is rare.172  A precise match is the 
goal, however, and, thus, achieving it is not an accident.  
Nevertheless, there are too many moving parts to almost any 
insurance business and too much uncertainty for that goal to be 
achieved very often.  There is no such thing in real-world 
insurance markets as the fixed-in-advance distribution of fully 
determinable risks.  There is always some uncertainty, and the 
 
171 See generally, Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, supra note --.  
172 See Ericson et al, supra note – at 158 (quoting an actuary as follows: “while actuarial 
science has all the trappings of science … it is best seen as the framework for a ‘guessing 
game’ …. You know you’re going to be wrong from the start.”); Fitzpatrick, supra note ---. 
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accumulating weight of research suggests that the extent of that 
uncertainty is quite substantial.      
Nevertheless, that ideal type can be useful for insurers: as 
an aspiration for underwriters and actuaries, as an explanation 
for why claims managers should not make exceptions in needy 
cases, and as a justification for resisting or promoting legal 
change.  Because of this utility, industry leaders use the ideal 
type to describe how insurance markets work to an extent that 
diverges from their private understanding.  This is not dishonest. 
The ideal type is a legitimate aspiration, and there is nothing 
wrong with advocating for a legitimate aspiration.  The wrong, if 
there is one, is on the part of observers who conflate advocacy and 
reality. 
That ideal type also can be useful in legal thought, for 
example to explore such important topics as the potential impact 
of liability insurance on deterrence,173 the comparative 
advantages of public and private systems of compensation,174 and 
the consequences for health insurance markets of outlawing 
preexisting condition exclusions and health-based pricing.175  For 
those and other similar purposes, the ideal type can serve as 
useful, simple model of how insurance works, as long as the limits 
of the model remain firmly in mind.    
Models, and theory more broadly, can help identify and 
perhaps even explain some of the problems and possibilities that 
exist in the world.  But models also can misdiagnose problems and 
hide possibilities.  When we act as if insurance markets require 
determinable risks whose distribution can be fixed in advance, we 
fail to see the many ways that insurance organizations manage 
uncertainty.  We lose sight of the resilience in insurance markets 
and of the flexibility and innovation that produce that resilience.  
Keeping that resilience more firmly in mind, we should give less 
weight to theoretical arguments that this or that liability reform 
will undermine insurance markets.  Insurance already involves 
 
173 See Shavell, supra note -- 
174 See Dwight Jaffee, Catastrophe Insurance, in DANIEL SCHWARCZ & PETER SIEGELMAN, 
EDS., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW (2015). 
175 See Hoffman, supra note -- 
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so much uncertainty, and insurers have so many ways to manage 
it, that the most likely result will always be that they will 
continue to muddle through.   
Investment Portfolio Benchmarking
mm, unless otherwise noted
Note: alternative assets = hedge funds, private equity funds, debt funds, real estate, venture capital, etc. 
Run-off Insurers
Enstar (12/31/18) Catalina (12/31/17) R&Q (12/13/17)
Fixed maturities $8,698 77% Fixed maturities $1,827 77% Fixed maturities £384 95%
Equities $367 3% Equities – – Equities £21 5%
Alternative assets $2,177 19% Alternative assets $561 23% Alternative assets – –
Total $11,242 100% Total $2,388 100% Total £406 100%
Fixed maturities stats: Fixed maturities stats: Fixed maturities stats:
Duration 4.9 Duration N/A Duration N/A
Credit rating A2/A+ Credit rating N/A Credit rating N/A
Traditional Insurers w/ Run-off Liabilities
Chubb (12/31/18) Travelers (12/31/18)
Fixed maturities $94,921 94% Fixed maturities $67,449 93%
Equities $770 1% Equities $368 1%
Alternative assets $5,277 5% Alternative assets $4,461 6%
Total $100,968 100% Total $72,278 100%
Fixed maturities stats: Fixed maturities stats:
Duration 3.7 Duration 4.5
Credit rating Aa2/AA Credit rating Aa2/AA
Traditional Insurers w/o Run-off Liabilities
AIG (12/31/18) Liberty Mutual (12/31/18) CNA (12/31/18)
Fixed maturities $293,615 93% Fixed maturities $59,853 86% Fixed maturities $41,671 94%
Equities $1,253 0% Equities $3,511 5% Equities $780 2%
Alternative assets $19,341 6% Alternative assets $6,437 9% Alternative assets $2,035 5%
Total $314,209 100% Total $69,801 100% Total $44,486 100%
Fixed maturities stats: Fixed maturities stats: Fixed maturities stats:
Duration 3.8 Duration 3.8 Duration 6.0
Credit rating N/A Credit rating N/A Credit rating N/A
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